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The Will to Freedom:
Reconsidering Hannah Arendt's Concepts of Love and the Will and Their Relationship to Freedom*

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Abstract

This paper answers two questions: (1) What is the relationship between freedom and the concepts of love and the will? (2) What does this relationship mean for the concept of freedom? By reading and interpreting Hannah Arendt's political thought, this paper argues that, on the one hand, through a self-transformation of the will—or, in Arendt's language, our willing activity—the will can turn into what she called "the spring of action". Our willing activity, Arendt said, must transform itself into activities of love, which serves as "a coupling, binding agent", to achieve self-sufficiency and to aid in building relationships. On the other hand, this paper contends that without this transformation—without the will transforming itself into a loving will—we cannot even begin to take action. The loving will constitutes the impetus that propels us to step outside of our solipsistic circumstances and, as "a binding agent", to get in touch with persons and things outside of ourselves. It is this impetus, or what I call the courage of movement, that Arendt viewed not only as

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the spring of action, but also as an invitation to freedom. Thus, the loving will refers to the will to freedom that paves the way to further political action. Ultimately, the conclusion of this article stresses that through Arendt's political thought we can understand not only why but also how love and the will are relevant to politics.

Keywords: Action, Augustine, Freedom, Hannah Arendt, Love

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It's only you, so lonely in this domain, invoke and desire
Dream and hope, you're drawing as you see the future
And if you choose to keep on marching on instead of running off
And cleared of any doubt

——— Yoasobi,[1] *The Blessing*

I. Introduction

Scholars widely agree that the Christian Saint Augustine influenced Hannah Arendt's political thought during her lifetime (Kerekes, 2022, pp. 4-6; Tsao, 2010, p. 40),[2] especially when it came to Augustine's concepts of love and the will and his understanding of the human second-birth as a new beginning (Chiba, 1995, p. 507; Tömmel, 2017, p. 107). According to Jerome Kohn, Arendt's last graduate assistant and close friend: "after lecturing on Augustine Arendt would often refer to him as 'my old friend'" (Scott, 1988, p. 395, n. 2). Arendt consistently referenced Augustine because "the problems he addressed were common to her own time as well" (Scott, 1988, pp. 406-407).

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1 Though the English version of this song's lyrics was written by the original composer, it still features some differences with the Japanese version: "一人孤独な世界で / 祈り願う / 夢を描き / 未来を見る / 逃げ出すよりも進むことを / 君が選んだのなら". For the lyrics to the full song (Yoasobi, 2022).

2 To streamline this paper's language, this paper uses the following abbreviations of all citations of Arendt's works (1978a, 1978b, 1982, 1996, 1998, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2016, 2017):

BPF	*Between Past and Future*
D	*Denktagebuch*
HC	*The Human Condition*
LA	*Love and Saint Augustine*
LK	*Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy*
LMT	*The Life of the Mind: Thinking*
LMW	*The Life of the Mind: Willing*
OR	*On Revolution*
OT	*The Origins of Totalitarianism*
RJ	*Responsibility and Judgment*
PP	*The Promise of Politics*

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They both faced a problem of reconciliation: One of reconciling themselves with the dark times when traditions failed to maintain safety and security of the community or, more realistically, of the world (for Augustine, it was the fall of Rome; for Arendt, it was the Nazification of Germany). Despite Arendt's frequent references to Augustine, however, "the connection of Augustine to Arendt's writing [is] a connection that has been largely ignored or dismissed" (Hammer, 2000, p. 84). The main reason for this neglect, according to Joanna Vecchiarelli Scott, is attributable not only to "the extraordinary density and obscurity of both Augustine's and Arendt's system of thought" but also to "the surprising lack of secondary analysis of the subject" (Scott, 1988, p. 401). Although their writings remain dense and obscure, these difficulties by no means inhibit scholars and theologists who strive to understand the links between their works.

A. Research background

Before Arendt's Ph.D. thesis *Der Liebesbegriff bei Augustin: Versuch einer philosophischen Interpretation* (1929) was reedited by Joanna Vecchiarelli Scott and Judith Chelius Stark and published in English in 1996, there were only a few papers in the Arendtian scholarship on Arendt's interpretation of Augustine's work (Boyle, 1987; Scott, 1988), which stands in sharp contrast to the substantial discourse surrounding Arendt's last book *The Life of the Mind* (Gray, 1979; Honig, 1988; Jacobitti, 1988; Keenan, 1994; Wayne, 1982; Young-Bruehl, 1982). Chiba Shin's paper "Hannah Arendt on Love and the Political: Love, Friendship, and Citizenship" appears to be the only work that addressed both of these writings and what they mean for Arendt's political thought (Chiba, 1995). The 1996 English translation of Arendt's Ph.D. thesis, titled *Love and Saint Augustine*, facilitated further research on her concept of the will and love from both Arendtian and Augustinian scholars (Almog, 2021; Barthold, 2000; Calcagno, 2015; Kerekes, 2022; Schoonheim, 2018; Tsao, 2010). These analyses focused on the dissertation's implications for Arendtian feminist theories and ethics of care (Borren, 2023; Ferguson, 2022; Gregory, 2001) as well as Arendt's (mis)understanding of Augustine and his

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Christian notion of love (Breidenthal, 1998; Butorac, 2018; Caver, 2018; Gregory, 2008; Grumett, 2020; Kaufman, 2020, Chapter 3; Paine, 2013; Scott & Stark, 1996; Williams, 2016, Chapter 11). Two Ph.D. theses, closely analyse Arendt's application of the Augustinian notions of love and the will to her political thought, clearly demonstrating how influential this edition of Arendt's Ph.D. thesis has been in the English-speaking world (Kampowski, 2008; Spengeman, 2014). However, Scott and Stark, the editors of the 1996 English translation of Arendt's thesis, are not without challenges: They have been accused of exaggerating the importance of Arendt's thesis in her life-long intellectual project, and of avoiding critiques of the thesis at around the time of its original publication in Germany (Kampowski, 2008, pp. 21-22, p. 171; Mathewes, 1997, pp. 490-491). Still, overall, Arendtian scholars, as well as Arendt's critics, have benefited from the 1996 translation of the thesis.

In recent years, some scholars have shifted their focus to Arendt's *Denktagebuch*, meaning "the thinking diary", cross-analysing it with Love and Saint Augustine and *The Life of the Mind* to comprehensively assess Arendt's concept of love. Although Tatjana Noemi Tömmel observes that, in *Denktagebuch*, Arendt wrote about love in an unsystematic and fragmented manner, she asserts that the diary is still "certainly the richest source for her thoughts on love, richer even than her dissertation about the concept of love in Augustine" (Tömmel, 2017, pp. 106-109). Liesbeth Schoonheim, who argues in line with Tömmel, also admits that "Arendt's comments on love [in *Denktagebuch*] are too fragmented to be incorporated into one comprehensive account" (Schoonheim, 2018, p. 102). Nonetheless, these features of Arendt's writing style by no means undermine her trenchant reflections on the human activity of loving; instead, "the scattered nature" of Arendt's reflections requires her readers not "to reconstruct them into a comprehensive argument but rather to trace the outline of what love could have meant to Arendt" (Schoonheim, 2018, p. 102). In other words, what readers come up with, after reading Arendt, is simply one potential interpretive silhouette of her understanding of phenomenal reality (e.g., our mental activity of willing)

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(Borren, 2023, pp. 54-55).[3] Schoonheim contends that "the silhouette, although it lacks the desirable conceptual sharpness and is not free from contradictions, is clear enough to function as a foil against which we can compare other conceptions of intersubjective relationships" (Arent, 1978a, p. 93; Schoonheim, 2018, p. 102; Villa, 2000, p. 1). On the one hand, this paper follows recent trends in the literature, incorporating *Denktagebuch* into its reading of *Love and Saint Augustine* and *The Life of the Mind*.[4] On the other hand, this paper aligns itself with Arendtians' spirit of writing (e.g., Borren, 2023, p. 55; Tömmel, 2017, p. 119; Tu, 2021; Young-Bruehl, 2004, p. 318). In other words, as Schoonheim has done, I work to produce my "silhouette" of Arendt's concepts of love and the will, and thier relationship to freedom (Schoonheim, 2018, p. 102).

B. Research questions and clarifications

The aim of this paper is to contribute a detailed analysis of Arendt's

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[3] Reality, for Arendt, is phenomenal in the sense that it is worldly. Arendt admitted "thinking can seize upon and get hold of everything real—event, object, its own thoughts; their realness is the only property that remains stubbornly beyond its reach" (LMT) (1978a, p. 49). That is, reality is something given, and thinking in a sense cannot change it. However, Arendt also clarified that "the reality of what I perceive is guaranteed by its worldly context, which includes others who perceive as I do, on the one hand, and by the working together of my five senses on the other" (LMT) (1978a, p. 50). We cannot change reality as we wish because it depends on others, namely, others' "common sense, the *sensus communis* [or] sixth sense" as we do (LMT) (1978a, p. 50). It is in this sense that reality is given from the world, thus it is phenomenal because it replies to us, not to some "ideals" in Plato's sense of the term. In other words, our thinking can change, but at the same time is checked by reality itself because "the subjectivity of the it-seems-to-me is remedied by the fact that the same object also appears to others though its mode of appearance may be different [;] it is the inter-subjectivity of the world" (LMT) (1978a, p. 50). I thank the reviewers for pushing me for an explanation of this point.

[4] Due to my current lack of German language skills, when I cite paragraphs from the *Denktagebuch*, I am citing its English version, which was translated by the original authors.

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concepts of love, the will, and their relationship with her concept of freedom, by which I facilitate developments of the existing scholarship of Arendt's political thought. To achieve this aim, this paper dives into Arendt's texts and attempts to answer two research questions: (1) What is the relationship between the concept of love and the concept of the will? (2) What is the relationship between the concept of the loving will and of freedom? On the one hand, this paper aims to interpret Arendt's concept of the will into what I call the concept of *the loving will,* and argues that it is through the will's self-transformation into a loving activity that the will can truly become "the spring of action", in Arendt's sense of the term. The relationship between love and the will signifies that without a close examination of Arendt's texts, we cannot have a clear picture of how her early reading of the will as "love of God" could develop into her late reading of the will as what I call "the loving will". On the other hand, my interpretation allows for an elaboration of why our mental activity of willing is still relevant to human freedom and action. Nevertheless, instead of considering the will to be the will *to power*, my Arendtian reading of the will suggests that human will is *the will to freedom*: Meaning the will to move or to leave our solipsistic circumstances and make relationships with other persons and things. In this sense, the relationship between the loving will and freedom signifies that the loving will is the condition of freedom: For Arendt, it is reasonable to say that without the self-transformation of the will into a pure loving activity (namely, an activity that depends on itself to be active. See the following sections of my discussion), human freedom cannot be possible. In short, this paper argues that the loving will is the very impetus that arouses the courage with which we move and leave our comfort zones and make connections with others beyond ourselves.

Interpreting Arendt's concepts of love and will into the concept of the loving will, and elaborate on its relationship to her concept of freedom, is this paper's contribution to the existing literature. Although numerous scholars have discussed Arendt's concept of love and its implication for freedom, they seem to have been unable to reach the same conclusion as this

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paper: Calling it Arendt's idea of "the will to freedom" (Beiner, 1992; Paine, 2013; Schoonheim, 2018; Tömmel, 2017). Take Rachel Paine's reading of Arendt as an example: although she stresses the importance of love as our energy to free action, she seems to make love a precondition to freedom, and therefore she seems unable to look closer at the conceptual relationship between love and freedom (Paine, 2013, pp. 121-122). This paper, nonetheless, makes love the primary condition of freedom, by which I am able to see how *the will* can change itself into *the loving will* and hence become our inner drive to free action, in Arendt's sense of the term. The difference between Paine and my argument is that: (1) To Paine, love as a precondition means that it is just one of the conditions prior to the realisation of freedom, which implies that love and freedom can be disconnected and (2) to me, love as the condition means that love and freedom are closely connected. This implies that without love, our freedom will not be realized (although in my following analysis such love refers to neither cupiditas nor caritas but to the shear activity of loving). In short, the paper makes contributions to the existing Arendtian scholarship.

Since developing my argument in alignment with Arendt's original understanding of the concepts implies that I must read her text closely and faithfully, the paper's actual faithfulness to interpretaions of her text will inevitably draw criticisms. The rest of this section briefly discusses two relevant forms of expected critiques: (1) Critiques of Arendt from Augustinian scholars; (2) ethical readings of Arendt. I try to defend both Arendt as well as my interpretations of her texts.[5]

First of all, the strongest if not the fiercest, attacks on Arendt's reading of Augustine have come from Augustinian scholars and Christian theologians.

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[5] Reviewers of this paper suggest that such a defense of arguments could be burdensome or distracting to the readers if I put it into a long and detailed response-section. Therefore, I have shortened my defense in this section. I appreciate the reviewers for providing me an opportunity to make this revision.

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For example, Gregory (2008) positions Arendt in the same camp as other Kantian liberal theorists, such as John Rawls, arguing that Arendt would affirm Rawls's concerns with the danger of putting love into the public realm (p. 213). In Gregory's view, "unlike dispassionate reason that secures political judgment, love is an emotion not to be trusted", as it is "vulnerable to prejudice, withdrawal and collective ideology" (Gregory, 2008, pp. 214-215). However, as the following section II. C. will address, Gregory appears to neglect not only Arendt's distinction between love and romance but also her discussion of the transformation of love as this paper argues. Had Gregory noticed Arendt's distinction between love and romance and her discussion on John Duns Scotus and the transformation of love, he likely would not have arrived at a conclusion so polemical to Arendt's thought.

Harsher critiques of Arendt's reading of Augustine come from Christian theologists, for instance Rowan Williams, who served as the 104th Archbishop of Canterbury for the Church of England. Two chapters of his book *On Augustine* (2016) are devoted to responding to Arendt's reading of Augustine: Chapter 6 addresses Arendt's depoliticalising reading of Augustine and Chapter 11 discusses her understanding of Christian love. His overall critique is that if "we try to love human beings independently of loving God, we ignore what they are; we do indeed 'use' them, in the contemporary sense of the word, we make them serve our purposes" (Williams, 2016, p. 200). To love others *without* God becomes a form of instrumentalization. Even worse, to love without God means to live among other human beings with eternal animosity and to live in an earthly community with eternal division and instability.

To be honest, Williams' arguments are certainly provoking and have been difficult for Arendtian scholars to "counterattack", though it's not impossible. As the final part of Section II will show, if love can be a pure activity regardless of the existence God, then to love without God by no means equates to living among others with endless animosity or to live in a community with eternal division. To Arendt, what can save the community from division doesn't need to be God, but could be something common and

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sharable (viz., *res publica*) among citizens. The *res publica* that keeps the community together may be the story of the foundation of a city, the legacy of its founders, or even its constitution (Yeh, 2023, pp. 112-113). If this is the case, then God is only one of many public things (in Bonnie Honig's terms) that may sustain the community (Honig, 2017). Naturally, this is an Arendtian argument that sounds unpleasant to many Christians' ears. Whether Arendt did justice to Augustine's thought is a rather difficult question that far exceeds the scope of this paper. However it is certainly feasible to offer a concise response to the Augustinians' critiques: Hannah Arendt *is not* an Augustinian under the prevailing definition of Augustinian scholarship.

Secondly, recent developments in the Arendtian scholarship have seen some researchers working to read Arendt alongside the French Jewish philosopher Emmanuel Levinas (e.g., Topolski, 2015), while others have sought to interpret Arendt through the lens of a feminist theory of ethics of care (e.g., Ferguson, 2022; Myers, 2013). Due to the scope of this paper, I will not compare the thought of Arendt with that of Levinas, but I shall briefly discuss the ethics of care, through which I offer a defense of my interpretation of Arendt's concept of love. Lucien Ferguson interprets Arendt's concept of love through the lens of the ethics of care by, on the one hand, tracing the etymology of the word *love* (both *love* and *care* can be traced back to the word amor), and on the other hand, interpreting Arendt's *amor mundi* (love of the world) into an apolitical or "spiritual precondition for the existence of the world itself" (Ferguson, 2022, pp. 942-944). After examining Arendt's Ph.D. thesis and her other texts, Ferguson concluded that "Arendt unequivocally locates amor mundi outside the political realm" and that "[A]mor mundi shows how the very existence of a political realm—and with it any possibility of democracy in a pluralistic society—depends on there being a set of pre- or nonpolitical ethical dispositions to sustain and protect it… there can be no politics without prior, or at least concomitant, ethical formations" (Ferguson, 2022, p. 961). In short, to Ferguson, Arendt's concept of love is the precondition of politics which, by itself, is ethical but unrelated to politics.

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Based on Ferguson's reading, Marieke Borren goes even further, contending that Arendt's concept of love "refers […] not to a normative, nor to a non-normative, but to *a pre-ethical and pre-political existential or ontological formation* that Sophie Loidolt has called 'protonormative'"; thus, "care for the world refers to the conditions of possibility for ethics and politics; *it precedes ethical and political norms, demands, and dispositions or attitudes* and allows for moral and political action and normative justification to come about in the first place" (Borren, 2023, p. 42; Loidolt, 2018). In other words, under this interpretation, Arendt's care for the world constitutes a proto-normative condition for both ethics and politics. Both Ferguson and Borren are right on some points and wrong on others. Ferguson is right to claim that Arendt's concept of love is *ante*-political (that is, Arendt seemed to suggest that loving activities exist and occur before any political activities), but she is wrong to frame being ante-political as equivalent to being ethical. My concern is that what is being ante-political equals means unnecessarily being ethical. Borren is right to assert that Arendt's concept of love is *proto*-in the sense that it logically precedes politics and even ethics, and she is also right on the point that "care is what we, humans, always already do and who we always already are". However, my concern is whether love (or care) is supposed to be something normative. Notably, Arendt's idea of normativity and morality is exceptional, which is in sharp contrast to her contemporary "Kantian" counterparts. To Arendt, saying something moral or normative is a matter of judgement rather than an imperative, implying that it is unnecessary to presuppose any criteria that are regulative and logically prior to such judgments (LK). This is why Arendt thought Kant's idea of morality and the Kantian sense of normativity (and even the contemporary political philosophies that are derived from such a Kantian legacy) were not where his "real political philosophy" lies (LK) (1982, p. 15; Arendt & Jaspers, 1992, p. 318). The standard to choose what pleases you from what displeases you comes from judgment instead of from moral law, or in Arendt's term, from common sense (LK) (1982, p. 69). Therefore, what is moral or normative matters to *judgment* rather than *commandment*, and matters to human freedom of choice rather than human obedience to the law. In this sense, the contemporary idea of

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humanity, which is deeply intertwined with the Kantian idea of morality, became the target of Arendt's critiques of Kant: Humanity or *humanitas* is a matter of community, or of choosing who you want to company with (Arendt, 2018, pp. 183-184). As a result, to read Arendt's concept of love as something moral or normative, typically in the contemporary Kantian sense of the term, could risk misinterpretations of Arendt's thought.

My "judgment" is that the words *ethical* and *normative* (if not *moral*) are too burdensome to be attached to Arendt's concept of love. It is a burden to call love ethical or normative—and the use of the prefix "proto-" does not sufficiently ease the burden. To Arendt, it seems that we ought to love because we can, but what she said about such a love, in my understanding, is that: (1) We can love the world but we forget how and why; and (2) We love, from which implies not we ought to love, no matter how minimal the extent of that normative implication is. Therefore, what Borren needs to say, instead of interpreting Arendt's concept of love as protonormative, is this: Care is what we, as human beings, always already do and who we always already are, *period*. All in all, we love the world because this is the way it is. Perhaps it is in this sense that Arendt can be seen as a genuine Augustinian—that is, love is the human condition under which we live on the earth (and it needs not be ethical or normative).

II. The Will to Make Relationships — On the Transformation of the Willing Activity

Hannah Arendt's Ph.D. thesis focused on analysing the concepts of love and the will in the thought of Saint Augustine, an important Christian theologian. At the beginning of her thesis, Arendt clearly understands that the relevance of others is a question that bothers Augustine, as "the question about the neighbour's relevance always turns into a simultaneous critique of the prevailing concept of love and of man's attitude toward himself and toward God" (LA) (1982, p. 3). In other words, her research question "concern[s] the other human

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being's relevance" to a Christian (LA) (1982, p. 4). The presence of others forces Christians to reflect upon their attitudes toward themselves and towards God.

To Augustine, God's commandments are definite. This is why he was baffled by the two seemingly contradictory commandments made by God: To love God and to love your neighbours. In the Bible, Mark 12:30-31 asserts the following (The Bible, 2008, p. 63):

> 30: And thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and with all thy strength; this is the first commandment.
> 31: And the second is like, namely this, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. There is none other commandment greater than these.[6]

To be clear, God puts these two commandments on par with each other. A Christian must fulfil them both at the same time. Thus, the question for Augustine is: How can a Christian love the neighbouring others to the same extent that they love God? To rephrase the question colloquially: If one is so busy loving God, how can they spare time to love their neighbours?

According to Arendt, Augustine ultimately found a reconciliation between these two commandments (albeit she was not satisfied with it). This reconciliation was found in the social life between Christians. If the mutual love between Christians could solve the problem, then the next questions for Augustine would be as follows: (1) Whether one chooses to love; and (2) whether one loves the correct thing. Since everything in the realm of human affairs starts from our will (i.e., our mental activity to choose what or whom we want to belong to), the willing activity equals a sense of "belonging to

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[6] Similar segments in the *Bible* (2018) can be found in *Leviticus* 19:18, *Matthew* 5:44, and *Mark* 12:33.

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what is 'outside myself'" (LA) (1982, p. 20) — we will things outside of us.

A. Transforming the will by loving God

Our will and our willing activity, according to Arendt's reading of Augustine, is an internal sense of belonging to something that is beyond oneself (LA) (1982, p. 20). The will has a major function that Arendt calls "attention" by which the will "unites our sense organs with the real world in a meaningful way, and then drags, as it were, this outside world into ourselves"; in other words, the will is "the great unifier" that binds things together (LMW) (1978b, p. 100, p. 107). However, "love is 'the stronger will'" (LA) (1982, p. 9). That is, love manifests the will's "functional operative aspect as a coupling, binding agent" to the greatest extent (LMW) (1978b, p. 102). The will becomes a *greater* unifier when it transforms and functions as love.

However, the will must transform itself into love to overcome the problem of the will's inherent split (LMW) (1978b, p. 87, p. 89). The experience of such an inner split, according to Arendt, is where Saint Paul discovered the human will (LMW) (1978b, pp. 63-73). As Barthold (2000) clearly states:

> The assertion 'Thou shalt' demands a response of either 'I will' or 'I will not'. If there were no choice to disobey, then there would be no point in a command of 'Thou shalt', and therefore no human freedom. We are in a position to utter either 'I will' or 'I will not' and this inability to get away from the 'I will' (since it is present even in the 'I will not') is the essential core of human freedom (p. 5).

The split of the will into "I will" vs. "I will not"—or, more precisely, into the *I-will* vs. the *I-nill*—is what disturbs Christians the most: "*Nolle* is no less actively transitive than *velle*, no less a faculty of will: if I will that I do not desire, I nill my desires" (LMW) (1978b, p. 89).

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Nonetheless, even though "the freedom of the Will draws exclusively in an inner power of affirmation and negation", our will never affirms the *I-nill* because the fact that we exist keeps us "from either thinking or willing absolute non-existence" (LMW) (1978b, p. 88, pp. 91-94). Therefore, God's law "addresses itself to the Will because 'the mind is not moved until it wills to be moved'" (LMW) (1978b, p. 88). What Christians will is the affirmation of God's commandments and his existence.

Even so, what Christians *will* and what they *can do* are separate questions: "To will and to be able to perform are not the same" (LMW) (1978b, p. 93). As Scott (1988) states, "the creature […] cannot comply with external laws, whatever their source, because a 'lack of power' plagues even those who have the will to 'seek the Creator rather than the world'" (p. 415). That is, even though one can will to be good, following God's commandments, one cannot perform good. There is a fissure between what one wills and what one can do.

Notably, the *I-nill* still plays an important role in the willing activity because "this discrepancy in the will itself […] permits us to understand the law both as a commandment from outside and as the will's simultaneous inability to comply with the law" (LA) (1996, p. 89). The *I-nill* allows Christians to understand God's commandments, but at the same time realise their inability to abide by the commandments. This is why "the gulf between will and power correspond to the uncertainty of 'to will' and 'to nill' (*partim velle, partim nolle*)" and why "the gulf between 'to will' and 'to be able' marks the creature that has no power over its own being" (LA) (1996, p. 87). Arendt explicates Augustine's point as follows:

> Man's inability to comply with the law does not consist in a lack of will but a lack of power, since in seeking the Creator rather than the world he has already made his law-bidden choices not to covet. To experience this inadequacy is to experience the gulf between "to will" and "to be able" (LA) (1996, p. 87).

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The difficulty here is that, as earthbound creatures, people live a sinful existence that is always driven by the habit to covet "what was first made by man" rather than what was made by God, "and that is his real sin" (LA) (1996, p. 81). Thus, the sinful people tend to will to belong to artificial rather than divine things. As long as "love is 'the stronger will'"—the strongest sense of belonging—people love the world rather than God and, in turn, remain unable to fulfil God's commandments (LA & LMW) (1996, p. 91, 1978b, p. 102).

According to Arendt, for Augustine, the only way to overcome the split and powerlessness of the will—the only salvation—is to love God. In other words, the will must transform itself into love, and that love must be directed at the correct thing, that being God. It is only in this that our strongest willing activity—love—may be coupled with God, from whom we gain the power not only to abide by God's commandments but also to experience His grace and salvation (LA & LMW) (1996, p. 88, 1978b, p. 102). To clarify, Arendt argued that there are two dimensions of Augustine's concepts of love: love as *aiming a*t and love as *referring back to*; as well as two forms of love, one correct and the other incorrect. On the one hand, in Arendt's reading of Augustine, "craving, or love, is a human being's possibility of gaining possession of the good that will make him happy, that is, of gaining possession of what is most his own" (LA) (1996, p. 9). Love means that people desire to possess something that will make them happy; while "craving is a combination of 'aiming at' and 'referring back to'. We aim at what we hope will make us happy" (LA) (1996, p. 45). On the other hand, since love as *craving* means that a person wants to possess something that will make them happy, to Augustine there are correct and incorrect forms of love, these forms being "distinguished by their objects" (LA) (1996, p. 18):

> The specific identification of earthly and mortal is possible only if the world is seen from the point of view of mortal man. Augustine's term for this wrong, mundane love that clings to, and thus at the same time constitutes, the world is *cupiditas*. In contrast, the right love [is] *caritas* (LA) (1996, p. 17).

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In sum, the correct or right form of love is *caritas*, and the incorrect or wrong form of love is *cupiditas*.

To be sure, the correctness of love depends on whether a person can constantly possess the things that they desire. Since temporal things in the mortal world are changeable, "our fear of losing always corresponds to our desire to have" (LA) (1996, p. 10). Therefore, loving such things leads to *cupiditas* (LA: 20). In contrast, the only thing that one can securely desire for good is God; therefore, love is *caritas*. To love God means both to aim at the absolute future of happiness after life (viz., eternity from God) and to refer back to the absolute past of creation since Adam was created (viz. eventual return to God) (LA) (1996, p. 13, p. 27, p. 47, p. 50). In summary, in Arendt's understanding of Augustine, the will must transform itself into love so that the problem of the will's inner split and powerlessness can be solved (LMW LMW) (1978b, p. 102); such a transformation is possible only through loving God—the only correct "thing" that all human beings can and must love.

B. Arendt's critique of Augustine's theory of neighbourly love

Hannah Arendt emphasised in her Ph.D. thesis that Augustine was unable to deal with the problem of the relevance of others by loving God *only* (LA) (1996, p. 7, pp. 98-99). Thus, by analysing the social life of Christians, he developed a theory that justified God's commandment to love our neighbours. Arendt, however, was not satisfied with this theory (LA) (1996, p. 111), and it took her (as this paper argues) four decades to come up with potentially satisfactory explanations for the transformation of love and the will to solve the problem of the relevance of others in the world (see Section II. C.). To be noted, in the "Willing" part of *The Life of the Mind*, Arendt did not mention the phrase "neighbourly love" any longer, thereby there would seem to be no proof in the text that says Arendt "solved" the problem of neighbourly love in her latest work. However, this is not actually the case. Arendt said that "in Augustine, as well as later in Duns Scotus, the solution of the Will's inner conflict comes about through a transformation of the Will itself, its

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transformation into *Love*", and she said that Augustine's concept of the will "finds its *redemption* in being transformed into love" (LMW) (1978b, p. 102, p. 104). In other words, Augustine and Duns Scotus are connected to each other in terms of how they understand willing activity, and Arendt claimed that it is from the transformation of the will itself that Augustine could find "redemption" of the will, not from God, but from love. Augustine's problem of neighbourly love could only be solved and redeemed by the will transforming itself into love. Arendt addressed Duns Scotus' text the most to elaborate on such a possibility of transformation.[7]

According to Arendt, Augustine was unable to explain God's commandment of neighbourly love by using his concept of *love as craving the right thing* (i.e., God):

> [T]he fulfilment and end of desire is 'enjoyment' (*frui*). This is the goal toward which love aims and which constitutes 'happiness' […] [Thus,] enjoyment and desire have this in common: they are concerned with things for their own sake. Their opposite is use (*uti*), which uses things as a means for obtaining something else (LA) (1996, pp. 32-33).

To love (that is, to possess the good to make one happy) is to enjoy the good for its own sake, not for other purposes. To love God is to love Him for His sake. However, since God's second commandment is to love your neighbour, which "*is* like" the first one (viz., to love God), the two commandments are on par with each other (LA) (Arendt, 1996, p. 9; The Bible, 2008, p. 63). One must love their neighbours for their neighbours' sake, not for the sake of loving God. But it is from this point forward that Augustine struggled to reconcile the two commandments: One can love God for God's sake but can by no means also love neighbours for their own sake *at the same time*. If God and the neighbours are the same, then it is logical to say that to love God

[7] I thank my reviewers for pushing me further for clarification on this point.

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means to love neighbours, and vice versa. Yet this must not be the case, since God explicitly made two commandments (if they were the same, then there would have been no need to have two).

According to Arendt, it is from the social life of Christians that Augustine finally found a theoretical resource to reconcile these two commandments. That is, through the formation by Christian believers of a community of faith:

> [T]he community of faith demands the whole man, as God also demands him. Thus, at the same time the faith of which it is said that "each has his own" is at the same time so radically the common faith that every other individual is viewed only from the perspective of the potential faith that would make him a fellow believer (LA) (1996, p. 99).

First, people who have faith in God realize that it is by loving God that they may be salved. Second, people who have faith in others love them not because they are all descendants from the same origin (i.e., Adam), but because each of them "should love one's neighbour not on account of his sin, which indeed was the source of equality, but on account of the grace that has revealed itself in him as well as oneself " (*tamquam te ipsum*), and "by being made explicit, equality obtains a new meaning; it becomes an equality of grace" (LA) (1996, p. 106). In other words, I love my neighbours because I see that they are as faithful to God as I am, and that God's grace is revealed through them—I see God in them, and thereby I love them. Arendt concludes Augustin theory of Christians' neighbourly love as follows:

> [W]hen I attain the explicitness of my own being by faith, the other person's being becomes explicit as well, in equality. Only then will the other become my brother ('brother' for neighbour and 'brotherly love' are terms found throughout Augustine's writings). Out of this explicit tie of brotherliness grow *caritas*, which is at the same time a necessity (LA) (1996, p. 109).

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I can see others as faithful, because I myself am faithful to God; hence, I can love my neighbours via loving God within them (LA) (1996, p. 96). As a result, I love God and love my neighbours. In this way, *caritas* develops from believers of God and holds them together as a community.

Arendt, however, was critical of Augustine's theory of Christian neighbourly love. She regarded it as an unsatisfactory answer to the research topic of her thesis: The relevance of others, i.e. other human beings. On the one hand, since "Augustine had to give an account of neighbourly love in this terminological context", his idea on neighbours was ambiguous (LA) (1996, p. 43):

> To the question "Who is my neighbour?" (*Proximus quis*— literally, "Who is next to me?") Augustine always replies, "Every man (*Omnis homo*). The answer is equivocal. It can mean literally everyone is next to me; I have no right to choose; I have no right to judge; all men are brothers. However, it can also mean that every member of the human species is equally near, that is, not everyone in his concrete uniqueness, but in the sense that every man shares the most abstract quality of being human with all others: "I love men because they are men" and not animals. [...] In other words, he loves his neighbour in sublime indifference regardless of what or who he is (LA) (1996, p. 43).

It seems that for Arendt, due to Augustine's equivocal terminology, what he defined as the neighbourly love of Christians is the *love of the human species as a whole* rather than *the love of a unique person* one happens to encounter. Hence, what is relevant to Christians is the human species rather than the unique human individual.

On the other hand, even though a Christian "loves his neighbour in sublime indifference regardless of what or who he is", meaning that "neighbourly love cannot be determined as desire and or craving", Arendt still hoped to find that "the love of my neighbour, or generally love between human beings, derives

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from a source altogether different [in terms of] appetites and desires". She points to this by re-reading Augustine's text: "*A different concept of love* comes into play, which we shall trace in the following chapters" (LA) (1996, p. 43, pp. 43-44). Nevertheless, throughout her thesis, she never seemed to find a *concept* from Augustine that could serve as a satisfactory answer to her research question. As she concludes, near the end of her Ph.D. thesis, the greatest and most evident problem of Augustine's theory of neighbourly love is:

> I never love my neighbour for his own sake, only for the sake of divine grace. This indirectness, which is unique to love of neighbour, puts an even more radical stop to the self-evident living together in the earthly city. This indirectness turns my relation to my neighbour into a mere passage for the direct relation to God himself. The other as such cannot save me. He can only save me because the grace of God is at work in him. We are commanded to love our neighbour, to practice mutual love, only because in so doing we love Christ. This indirectness breaks up social relations by turning them into provisional ones (LA) (1996, p. 111).

In other words, since other persons are relevant to us only in terms of the human species rather than their unique selves, we love them for the sake of God rather than for their sake. We love them indirectly because we love God directly. It is this indirectness to others that worried Arendt the most because "although we can meet the other only because both of us belong to the human race, it is only in the individual's isolation in God's presence that he becomes our neighbour" (LA) (1996, p. 112).

It is *this* isolated individual—here and now that we face as a unique person—that we happen to encounter because "we cannot choose our 'beloved'", meaning the ones that we love as our neighbours (LA) (1996, p. 110). Since Augustine cannot explain the relevance of others *qua* individuals, Arendt concludes that his theory of neighbourly love is ultimately unsatisfactory in terms of its ability to answer her research question. Notably, she attached a

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footnote to the above quotation, explaining that, to Augustine, "in loving Love, he loves God" (LA) (1996, p. 97, n. 13).

C. Transforming the will through loving activity

Arendt carried this unanswered question with her for nearly four decades, only finding a seemingly satisfactory answer far later in life. She was seeling sought other theoretical resources to possibly answer how others are relevant. In her last completed work before her untimely death, "Willing" in *The Life of the Mind*, Arendt seemed to find a way to answer this question by preserving something still worthy of theorisation from Augustine's thought, and combining it with the thought of another Christian theologian, John Duns Scotus. She did this in three steps.

First, Arendt agreed with Augustine that the will must transform itself into love so that "the uniting force of love is stronger", or that "love is 'the stronger will' " (LA & LMW) (1996, p. 91, 1978b, p. 102). In other words, it is *only* when our will becomes love that love "is not extinguished when it reache[s] its goal but enables the mind 'to remain *steadfast* in order to *enjoy*' it" (LMW) (1978b, p. 102). Arendt wrote in "Willing" that, when Augustine's will transforms itself into love, then:

> Love [serves] as a kind of enduring and conflictless Will […] Augustine's Love exerts its influence through the "weight"—the will resembles a weight"—it adds to the soul, thus arresting its fluctuations. Men do not become just by knowing what is just but by loving justice. Love is the soul's gravity, or the other way round: "the specific gravity of bodies is, as it were, their love. What is saved, moreover, in this transformation of his earlier conception is the Will's power of assertion and denial: There is no greater assertion of something or somebody than to love it, that is, to say: I will that you be—*Amo: Volo ut sis* (LMW) (1978b, p. 104).

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It is when the will transforms itself into love that the will can recover from its inner split of *I-will* and *I-nill*.

Second, Arendt discovered that Augustine regrettably neglected the consequences of such loving and willing people. What he did not see is that:

> Every man, being created in the singular, is a new beginning by virtue of his birth; if Augustine had drawn the consequences of these speculations, he would have defined men, not like the Greeks, as mortals, but as 'natals,' and he would have defined freedom of the will not as the *liberum arbitrium*, the free choice between willing and nilling, but as the freedom of [the fact] that men are *born*—newcomers again and again in a world that preceded them in time. The freedom of spontaneity is part and parcel of the human condition. Its mental organ is the Will (LMW) (1978b, pp. 109-110).

To be clear, for Augustine, the will needs to transform itself into love. But such a transformation is only possible only by loving the correct thing: God. It is through God that the will is transformed but, to Arendt's concern, it comes at the expense of the uniqueness of others. From this point forward, Arendt sought out an answer from John Duns Scotus regarding the relevance of others (LMW) (1978b, p. 134).

Third, as Arendt put it, Duns Scotus disagreed with Augustine's concept of love as a craving by analysing the *experientia interna* of the will, meaning "an experience of the mind whose evidence can be denied only by those who lack the experience, as a blind man would deny the experience of colour" (LMW) (1978b, p. 134, p. 145). However, since everyone wills and thus has the experience of willing, Duns Scotus essentailly means that everyone has such an internal experience of the mind. What is striking about Duns Scotus' argument is that the mind, by such an internal experience, seems to be able to transform itself, and "no divine intervention is necessary to redeem the

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willing ego" (LMW) (1978b, p. 141). Duns Scotus' concept of love is not *craving*, but *loving* as a *sheer activity* unto itself (LMW) (1978b, p. 145). To Arendt, such an activity can sustain itself regardless of the existence of God.

What does Duns Scotus mean by loving as a *sheer activity*? In Arendt's reading, Duns Scotus contends that human beings, as willing creatures, are "forced to switch from the *activum* to the *factivum*" to save themselves (LMW) (1978b, p. 142). To be clear, "there is a distinction Scotus made—probably under Aristotle's influence—between *activum* and *factivum*. It is between sheer activity, the Aristotelian *energeia*, which has its end and *ergon* within itself, and fabrication, *facere*, which consists in 'producing or fashioning some external object'" (LMW) (1978b, p. 142). In general, Duns Scotus distinguished human fabrication from mental activities, which are sheer activities. Nevertheless, our will can switch itself from sheer activity to fabrication:

> Because there is an I-can inherent in every I-will, and this I-can sets limitations on the I-will that are not outside the willing activity itself. "*Voluntas est potential quia ipsa aliquid potest*," "the Will is power because it *can* achieve something," and this potency, inherent in the Will, is indeed the "opposite of the *potentia passiva* of the Aristotelians. It is an active […] powerful I-can […] which the ego experiences" (LMW) (1978b, p. 142).

In other words, "with this experience of the Will as a mental potency whose power […] inspires it and endows it with self-confidence", Augustine's problem of the powerless will (stemming from the will's self-split into *I-will* and *I-nill*) is solved (LMW) (1978b, p. 142). To Duns Scotus, we all have internal experiences of the mind that our will can switch from sheer mental activity to forge things. In other words, the will "can achieve something."

However, Duns Scotus further argues that our willing activity can switch itself back to sheer activity when the will transforms itself into love. This

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"switching back" is also explainable by our internal experiences of the mind. To be sure, the major function of the will is *attention* by which the will "unites our sense organs with the real world in a meaningful way, and then drags, as it were, this outside world into ourselves"; in other words, the will is "the great unifier" that serves to bind thing together (LMW) (1978b, p. 100, p. 107). "[Y]et even his mental activities are never unrelated to the world given to the sense", as Arendt argues (LMW) (1978b, p. 143). In that sense, our willing activity (as a binding force capable of coupling things together) is in fact an *impetus*, propelling us to make relationships with things or with other people in the world. From such an inner experience, Duns Scotus underscored the importance of our senses to the world:

> [T]he Will is "bound up with the sensory appetite" and "its innate function is to "enjoy itself." […] The decisive words here are the *condelectati sibi*, a delight inherent in the willing activity itself as distinct from the delight of desire in having the desired object, which is transient—possession extinguished the desire and the delight. […] Hence, he [i.e., Duns Scotus] distinguishes sharply between will and desire because only the will is not transient. An inherent delight of the will in itself is as natural to the will as understanding and knowing are to the intellect, and can be detected even in hatred; but its innate perfection, and final peace between the two-in-one, can come about only when the will is transformed into *love* (LMW) (1978b, p. 143).

Our will has an innate delight when the will is active. According to this, the will is no longer the same as desire: "'*Amo: Volo ut sis*,'or 'I love you; I want you to be'—and not 'I want to have you' or 'I want to rule you'" (LMW) (1978b, p. 136). Duns Scotus said that such a "transformation of the will into love with its inherent *delectation* [viz., delight] is decisive" because it "does not signify that loving ceases to be an activity whose end is within itself" (LMW) (1978b, pp. 143-144). In other words, our willing activity can switch back to the sheer activity of loving by the internal experience of the will when

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the will is active and delight.[8]

At the end of Arendt's interpretation of Duns Scotus, she elaborated on his idea of *beatitude* to explain *how* the will can transform itself into a sheer activity of loving. Arendt came up with her own concept of love based on Aristotle's idea of *performing art*, which is without dependence on help from the divine (LMW) (1978b, p. 123). Arendt quoted Duns Scotus' idea of beatitude as follows: "unconditional acceptance is called 'Love' by Scotus: '*Amo: vol out sis.*' 'Beatitude is, therefore, the act by which the will comes in contact with the object presented to it by the intellect and loves it, thus satisfying its natural desire for it'" (LMW) (1978b, p. 144). Arendt further elaborates on Duns Scotus' idea of beatitude to form her own concept of love:

> The mind, transcending the existential conditions of the "wayfarer," or pilgrim on earth, has an intimation of such future blessedness in its experience of sheer activity, that is, in a transformation of willing into loving. […] In Augustine the transformation comes about because of the binding force of the will […] But for Scotus

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[8] What we experience from our willing activity is delight. In this sense, there seems to be a link between our willing and judging activities because the later one is about our ability to distinguish pleasure from displeasure. Although this is a topic too broad to be tackled in this paper, my argument and interpretation of the loving will fits into this observation of the connection between willing and judging. The reason is that even though our willing activity is the inner drive that makes us move, act, and make relationships with others (and we experience delight from such activities), Arendt faced anothe problem that needs explanation: In which moment does a person decide to move and act? It's correct that, we now have a strong engine that drives us to make action, but *when* we decide to go beyond our solipsistic circumstances is still a question (to move now? Or 30 seconds later? Or 1 minute later?). This is a problem that Arendt, in the very last paragraph of LMW, was about to tackle, but due to her unfortunate early death, we will never know her answer in the final part of *The Life of the Mind*. My reading of Arendt doesn't mean not to give an alternative to her possible solution to the impasse of willing activity, but only to argue that our loving will is the very inner drive that makes us move and act. I thank the reviewers for pushing me further on this clarification.

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> the experiential ground of love's everlastingness is that he conceives of a love that is not only, as it were, emptied, purified of desires and needs, but in which the very *faculty* of the Will is transformed into sheer activity (LMW) (1978b, pp. 144-145).[9]

Thus, Arendt concludes that when the will is:

> [t]ransformed into love, the restlessness of the will is stilled but not extinguished; love's abiding power is felt not as the arrest motion—as the end of fury of war is felt as the quiet of peace—but as the serenity of a self-contained, self-fulfilling, everlasting movement. Here are not the quiet and delight that follow upon a perfect operation, but the stillness of an act resting in its end. In this life we know of such acts in our *experientia interna*, and, according to Scotus, we should be able to understand them as intimations of an uncertain future when they would last forever (LMW) (1978b, p. 145).

"The idea that there could be an activity that finds its rest within itself is as surprisingly original" because Scotus revealed "new insights, all of which could probably be explicated as the speculative conditions for a philosophy of freedom" (LMW) (1978b, pp. 145-146).

D. The will to move freely

In summary, our mental activity of willing as a binding force—that is, making relationships with others—can transform itself into love, the "stronger

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[9] Here, Scotus' everlastingness of love, to Arendt, means everlasting movement. "Transformed into love, the restlessness of the will is stilled but not extinguished; love's abiding power is felt not as the arrest of motion—as the end of the fury of war is felt as the quiet of peace—but as the serenity of a self-contained, self-fulfilling, everlasting movement" (LMW) (1978b, p. 145). I thank the reviewer for notifying me for clarification.

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will", through its internal experience of delight (the delight of love, or the delight of making relationships). It is through this internal experience that the will not only cures its inner split (between *I-will* and *I-nill*), but switches from fabrication to the power of *I*-can, "the will is power because it *can* achieve something" (LMW) (1978b, p. 142). In Arendt's understanding, through the delightful experiences of making relationships, the will can transform itself independently ─ regardless of the existence of God ─ shifting our willing activity into a sheer activity in Aristotle's sense of the term (i.e., *energeia* or the performing art) (LMW) (1978b, p. 123, p. 142). It is when our willing activity transforms itself into the sheer activity of loving that the will becomes a loving will. Without depending on anything but itself, the will fulfils its own transformation and thereby truly becomes "the spring of action, that is, as a 'power of spontaneously beginning a series of successive things of states' (Kant)" (LMW) (1978b, p. 6).

This power to begin something, or spontaneity is what Arendt called *freedom* (BPF) (2006, p. 164).[10] Arendt addressed that Augustine, by translating the Greek sense of freedom *αρχειν* (árkhō) into *liberum arbitrium*, incorporated his Roman experience into his religious experience, conceiving in his book *the City of God* that freedom is "not as an inner human disposition but as a character of human existence in the world" (BPF) (2006, p. 165). Our loving will or our power to begin, in this Augustinian sense, is our freedom, and this is how we exist in the world. Arendt also cited Augustine by saying that "man is free because he is a beginning and was so created after the universe had already come into existence: [*Initium*] *ut esset, creates est homo, ante quem nemo fuit*" (BPF) (2006, p. 166). From Augustine's writings, this "political experience of Roman antiquity" was introduced into Christianity, and "freedom *qua* beginning" marks the nature of human beings (BPF) (2006, p. 166). Or in Arendt's words, loving will (or the power to begin something) is our "faculty of action" by which "the fact of natality… is, in other words, the birth of new

[10] I appreciate the reviewers for pushing me toward further clarification and perfection of my argument.

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men and the new beginning, the action they are capable of by virtue of being born" (HC) (1998, p. 247). We are all born with the potency to begin something, which is another way of saying that we are all born with the potency of a loving will, as this paper argues.

What is interesting and worthy of notice here is that since Arendt makes freedom and action synonyms, she did not use the phrase "freedom of action" throughout her writings. Instead the term, "freedom of movement" seems to be what Arendt proposed using the most in her late life. This term never appeared in *The Human Condition*.[11] It first appeared in her *Introduction into Politics*, which, as Kohn observed, was planned to be written in German for "*a leading into* (*intro-ducere*) genuine political experiences", and dedicated to Karl Jaspers (PP) (2005, viii). In that essay, *freedom to begin*, or to put something into motion, means, of course, *freedom to act*. However, to act (and this is where Arendt brought in a nuance to the meaning of freedom, in comparison to *The Human Condition*) is a bodily action, that is, a bodily movement:

> This freedom of movement, then—whether as the *freedom to depart and begin something new* and unheard-of or as the freedom to interact in speech with many others and experience the diversity that the world always is in its totality—[…] is rather the substance and meaning of all things political. In this sense, politics and freedom are identical, and wherever this kind of freedom does not exist, there is no political space in the true sense (PP & OT) (2005, p. 129, 2017, Chapter 9).

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[11] Even though the term never appears in that book, there are, however, some texts from which we could "smell" the thread of Arendt's thought on the freedom of movement. "Men in the plural, that is, men in so far as they live and move and act in this world, can experience meaningfulness only because they can talk with and make sense to each other and to themselves" (HC) (1998, p. 4). "Because the actor always moves among and in relation to other acting beings, he is never merely a 'doer' but always and at the same time a sufferer" (HC) (1998, p. 190). I thank the reviewer for notifying me on this point.

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It seems that Arendt's idea of the *freedom of movement* has two meanings (though I think there is actually only one meaning in terms of our bodily movement): (1) The freedom to move ours bodies, i.e., in action or motion; and (2) The freedom to move (ours bodies) to other places, i.e., in departure or entry. Arendt seemed to put emphasis on the second meaning: "Freedom of movement, the power of moving about unchecked by disease or master, was originally the most elementary of all liberties, their prerequisite" (LMW) (1978b, p. 200). In other words, Arendt's idea of "freedom of action" (though she never used such a phrase) means the freedom of bodily movement: We are all born with the potency to begin or put something into motion. This is why Arendt observed that "power and freedom in the sphere of human plurality are in fact synonyms" (LMW) (1978b, p. 201).

The *loving will* is hereby becoming what I refer to as *the will to freedom*: The will to move freely from one place to another (e.g., from one's own solipsistic "comfort zone" to the realm of others) and the will to achieve things with those whom one encounters. On the one hand, the "criteria" of the loving will is *I-can* rather than *I-will*, as Arendt believed that *I-can* fits the original meaning of freedom:

> [I]t is certain that in the frame of pre-Christian thought freedom was localised in the I-can; freedom was an objective state of the body, not a datum of consciousness or of the mind. Freedom meant that one could do as one pleased […] According to Greek etymology, that is, according to Greek self-interpretation, the root of the word for freedom, *eleutheria*, is *eleuthein hopōs erō*, to go as I wish, and there is no doubt that the basic freedom was understood as freedom of movement. A person was free who could move as he wished; the I-can, not the I-will, was the criteria (LMW) (1978b, p. 19).

The will under such a standard of *I-can*—under the idea that "I can freely move to wherever I wish"—equals the will to freedom of movement from

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which the political meaning of this will emerges.[12] The loving will means moving freely from one's own place to the realm of others. In this case, "we first become aware of freedom […] not in the intercourse with ourselves" but in "the free man's status, which enabled him to move, to get away from home, to go out into the world and meet other people in deed and word" (BPF) (2006, p. 147).

On the other hand, the loving will in the Arendtian sense of the term is truly free because:

> The will is either an organ of free spontaneity that interrupts all causal chains of motivation that would bond it or it is nothing but an illusion. In respect to desire, on one hand, and to reason, on the other, the will acts like 'a kind of *coup d'état*,' as Bergson once said, and this implies, of course, that 'free acts are exceptional'" (LMT) (1978a, p. 213).

The will is free because it *can* break the causal chains (like a *coup d'état* occurring suddenly) and seek to "achieve something" (LMW) (1978b, p. 142). In this sense, the will to freedom stands in sharp contrast to the will to power, which Arendt constantly criticised for seeking control and domination (BPF, HC, & LMW) (2006, pp. 155-163, 1998, p. 191, 1975b, p. 187).

In addition, the delightful experiences of this willing activity "can be trusted to summon up in themselves the *courage* that lies at the root of action, of becoming an active being" (PP) (2005, p. 202). The loving will gives us courage "to leave the protective security of our four walls and enter the public realm, not because of particular dangers which may lie in wait for us, but because we have arrived in a realm where the concern for life has lost its validity" and to move to the realm of men (BPF) (2006, p. 155). With this

[12] However, as mentioned in Section II. C., I do not go into the political meaning of the will to freedom, as it is beyond the scope of this paper.

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courage at hand, our will serves as an impetus propelling us to make relationships with others. As Paine (2013) argues, "the activity of love is experienced as the *energy* of relating to another" (p. 118).[13] With this energy, and with this courage, "love motivates us to deepen our understanding of the other, to live our own lives more fully, to better understand ourselves" (Paine, 2013, p. 119). This further implies an openness of the will, or a reminder of our willing activity; since "we cannot choose our 'beloved'" others, we must be open to, and engage with, any possible others that we happen to encounter in this world. What Augustine taught us, according to Arendt, is that we can learn from and *imitate* God's way of loving (LA) (1996, p. 110). That is, God can simultaneously love all human beings and love each of them as unique individual persons. We cannot do this simply because we, as earthbound creatures, are not God. Nonetheless, we can at least imitate His way of loving by: (1) Being open and engaging with any possible others whom we happen to encounter; and, (2) treating them as unique individuals, as *who* they are.[14] The will to freedom, as the epigraph of this paper shows, is the impetus that *en*-courages one "to keep on marching on instead of running off" from men, the many other

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[13] I agree with Paine that love is an energy but disagree with her that *caritas* is a precondition of freedom (2013, pp. 121-122). Also see page 5 of this paper. My reading is different from Paine because she seems to suggest that Arendt's concept of love as *caritas*, namely, the theological love without transformation, is something logically prior to Arendt's concept of freedom. I contend that, for Arendt, love can transform itself without recourse to any theological intermediary. It is when love is self-transformed *by itself* that it becomes the condition of freedom. I appreciate the reviewer for pushing me to make this clarification.

[14] A reviewer wonders whether Arendt did make any advanced argument in *The Life of the Mind* since Arendt seemed to have already suggested her solution to the problem of neighbourly love by "imitation of God". My response is that Arendt did make an advanced argument in her late life, typically the one about the imitation of God. To be noted, in *The Life of the Mind*, Arendt did not address such a God-like imitation. Instead, through reading Scotus, she contended that love turns into an activity that is active by itself without the help of God. If that is the case, then to imitate God is merely one example of how we love, that is: we can just love, period. To late Arendt, to love is to love, regardless of the existence of God. This is, as this paper argues, the conclustion that Arendt seemed to have reached in her late life.

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persons on earth.

Lastly, since our "mere existence, that is, all that which is mysteriously given us by birth and which includes the shape of our bodies and the talents of our minds, can be adequately dealt with only by […] the great and incalculable grace of love, which says with Augustine, '*Volo ut sis* (I want you to be),' without being able to give any particular reason for such *supreme and unsurpassable affirmation*" (OT) (2017, p. 394), love, as Schoonheim (2018, p. 107) reads from Arendt's *Denktagebuch*, "affirms the contingent dimensions of our existence that evade our individual control, or, in yet other terms, the existentia of our existence" (D) (2002, XII 12, p. 276; 13, pp. 277-279). Such a "supreme and unsurpassable affirmation" of the human existence on earth is what Tömmel (2017, pp. 117-119) reads in Arendt's concept of love as the unconditional affirmation of one's present reality and givenness (D) (2002, XXXVI 67, p. 748).[15] Going even further, love is an unconditional affirmation of one's being (regardless of whether it is the being of others or the being of ourselves). As Ronald Beiner states in his interpretive essay on Arendt's lecture of Kant:

> [A] phrase that recurs several times in Arendt's unpublished lectures; it is Augustine's "*Arno: Volo ut sis*": to love is, in effect, to say "I want you to be." Because of "the sheer arbitrariness of being," because of the fact that "we have not made ourselves," we

[15] My reading of the concept of loving will is, rather, an interpretation of Arendt's concept of will, not actually love. I agree with Tömmel' reading of *Denktagebuch* that in one of the many threads of Arendt's thought on love, there is one that can be called "unconditional affirmation" of others' presence in the world. This paper builds on Tömmel's understanding, but argues further that it is when our will transforms itself into such form of the unconditional affirmation that the will can really become the spring of action. I call this will, in terms of such unconditional affirmation, our loving will. My contribution is that the paper traces Arendt's text from her PhD. thesis to *The Life of the Mind*, on the one hand, and argue that the main question is about freedom, not only love or will. Tömmel did not mention these points. I thank the reviewers for pushing me for further clarification.

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> "stand in need of confirmation. *We are strangers, we stand in need of being welcome.*" It is by judging that "we confirm the world and ourselves"; with the faculties given us, "we make ourselves at home in the world" (LK) (1982, pp. 154-155).

In this sense, the will to freedom is the will to welcome, to love and to make relationships with those whom we encounter—anytime and anywhere. It is in love (and thereby the loving will) that our will has "the faculty of saying 'Yes'" (LMW) (1978b, p. 144). My reading, i.e., *the will to freedom*, which goes further than Beiner, Schoonheim, Tömmel, and Paine, is that for Arendt, the will to freedom can mean saying yes to others. This is indeed the spring of upcoming political action, preparing one to act in concert with others.

III. Conclusion: The Audacity of Freedom

This paper reinterprets Hannah Arendt's concepts of love and the will as well as their relations to her concept of freedom. Having read Arendt's text, and defending my interpretation, this paper argues that the will can transform itself into love, enabling the will to enjoy itself through the delight of forming relationships with others in the world. Through this transformation, the will becomes the *loving will* or a sheer activity of relationship development. The loving will pursues relationships to bind with others; thus, it is an impetus that propels us to move: Either *out* of our solipsistic four walls, or *into* the realms of others. The will in this sense implies freedom: The ability to freely move from one place to another, or to move in and out. The freedom hereby means *freedom of movement*. Our will becomes the will to freedom: It enjoys itself as a sheer activity of freely relating to others. Through the experiences and delights of developing relationships, the loving will constantly encourages us to move. With this impetus, we dare to leave our comfort zones and to move toward the realms of others. With it, we acquire the audacity of freedom, or, as described in the epigraph leading into this paper's introduction, the courage to "keep on marching on instead of running off". It is only when our

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will transforms itself into love that it genuinely constitutes, in Arendt's sense of the term, "the spring of action".

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趨向自由的意志：
重探漢娜・鄂蘭愛與意志的概念暨它們和自由的關係*

杜坤峰**

摘　要

本文將回答兩個問題：(1) 自由和愛以及意志等概念之間的關係爲何？(2) 這種關係對自由的概念又具有什麼意義。藉由閱讀與詮釋漢娜・鄂蘭的政治思想，本篇論文主張一方面，透過意志的自我轉化－或以鄂蘭的語彙來說，我們的意志活動－意志可以轉變成她所謂「行動的泉源」。鄂蘭指出，我們的意志活動必須自我轉變成愛的行動，並作爲「聯結與羈絆的媒介」來作用著，如此才能達成自足並有助於建立起關係。另一方面，本文宣稱若沒有這種轉化－即意志未能自我轉化爲愛的意志－則我們甚至無法開始行動或做任何事情。愛的意志構成了一種動力，它推動了我們走出獨我的情境並且－作爲「羈絆的媒介」－讓我們接觸自身之外的人與事物。而正是這種動力（或者我稱之爲移動的勇氣）使得鄂蘭不僅將它視爲行動的泉源，也視爲通往自由的邀約。因此，愛的意志指的是通往自由的意志，它也爲進一步的政治行動鋪墊了道路。最後本文的結論強調，我們透過鄂蘭的政治思想不僅可以理解爲何愛和意志與政治有關，以及它們如何能彼此關聯。

關鍵詞：行動、奧古斯丁、自由、漢娜・鄂蘭、愛

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本研究承蒙國科會專題研究計畫「趨向自由的意志：重探 Hannah Arendt 之自由概念暨它和行動、法律、國際政治等概念間的關係」（NSTC 112-2410-H-110-100-MY2）之補助而得以完成。作者感謝審查人們的諸多評論與批評，據此本文方有可能愈趨完善。作者也感謝編輯委員會成員的提問與悉心的修改建議。
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