台灣電子業家族經理人之外部董事會連結與公司創新:論控制家族代理問題之影響
Family Executives’ External Directorate Ties and Corporate Innovation in Taiwan’s Electronics Industry: The Role of Controlling Family Agency Problems
國立嘉義大學財務金融學系教授(Department of Banking and Finance, National Chia-Yi University);國立成功大學會計學系暨財務金融研究所教授(Department of Accountancy and Graduate Institute of Finance and Banking, National Cheng Kung University);逢甲大學財稅學系助理教授(Department of Public Finance, Feng Chia University)
摘要
家族經理人因為排外繼承而有異質性不足、創新觀點受限的問題。植基於資源依賴理論,家族經理人可經由外部董事會連結,俾取得多元化資訊以提升公司創新。鑑此,本研究首先檢測家族經理人外部董事連結和公司創新之關係。其次,當家族控制權與所有權愈偏離時,代理問題愈大,家族經理人從事外部董事連結可能植基於本身及其所屬控制家族的利益,使派出公司之創新成效受到負面衝擊。據此,本研究進一步檢測家族代理問題對「家族經理人外部董事會連結與公司創新關聯性」的影響。以2000 到2006 年台灣電子業上市家族公司之家族經理人為樣本,實證結果發現,家族經理人之外部董事會連結與公司創新呈正向關係;然而,控制家族之代理問題越嚴重時,削弱了外部董事連結對公司創新的正面效果。
Abstract
Top management teams of family firms are often characterized as having less diversity and professionalism, which could limit corporate innovation. Based on the Resource Dependence Theory, to build external directorate ties is one approach to accessing different resources and information which can benefit firms’ innovation. However, controlling families’ external directorships may bring two distinct effects on firms due to, on the one hand, their strong needs for heterogeneous ideas and, on the other hand, the potential agency problems related to family firms. Given the prevalence of family firms in Taiwan’s information and electronics industry, we first examine the relationship between family executives’ directorate ties and innovation. Next, considering the controlling families’ ownership structures, we further examine how the controlling family’s agency problem affects the aforementioned relationship. Using a sample of family firms in Taiwan’s information and electronics industry, we predict and find a positive association between the quality of family executives’ external directorate ties and firms’ innovation performance. Moreover, we find this positive association to be offset by controlling families’ entrenchment incentives arising from their divergence between control and cash flow rights. These results imply that family firms with greater agency problems allow their family-member executives to accept at-will external directorships while ignoring firms’ overall benefits.
關鍵詞
- 類型
- 論文
- 期刊
- 臺大管理論叢
- ISSN
- 1018-1601
- 卷期
- 24卷2期
- 出版
- 2014年06月
- 頁碼
- 181–212
- 編號
- NTUEJ00010131
同期目錄
- 台灣地區大學教授薪資待遇之合理性初探: 大、中、小學教師之比較研究吳清在(Tsing-Zai C. Wu);施念恕(Nien-Su Shih);朱靜玉(Ching-Yu Chu)・頁 1–53
- 以樂透觀點檢視現金增資股票申購需求王朝仕(Chao-Shi Wang)・頁 53–82
- 東亞地區商業銀行效率之實證分析盧永祥(Yung-Hsiang Lu);王俊賢(Chun-Hsien Wang);蔡芳梅(Fang-Mei Tsai)・頁 83–114
- 蓬生麻中,不扶而直:社群歸屬感和科技使用之效果侯勝宗(Sheng-Tsung Hou);樊學良(Hsueh-Liang Fan)・頁 115–150
- 非營利醫院負債融通與捐贈收入的關聯性郭振雄(Jenn-Shyong Kuo);何怡澄(Yi-Cheng Ho);羅光達(Kuang-Ta Lo)・頁 151–180
- 台灣電子業家族經理人之外部董事會連結與公司創新:論控制家族代理問題之影響蔡柳卿(Liu-Ching Tsai);楊朝旭(Chaur-Shiuh Young);許慧雯(Hui-Wen Hsu)・頁 181–212
- 公司治理結構與股東常會可接近性之關係張力(Li Chang);侯啟娉(Chi-Ping Hou);林翠蓉(Tsui-Jung Lin);許蕙欣(Wen-Hsin Shu)・頁 213–248
- 員工每日情緒對情緒勞動之影響:情感事件理論的觀點蕭婉鎔(Wan-Jung Hsiao)・頁 249–282
- 基金績效歸屬與基金流量之關聯性陳獻儀(Hsien-Yi Chen);楊淑玲(Shu-Ling Yang);張眾卓(Chong-Chuo Chang);陳婉榕(Wan-Rung Chen)・頁 283–308
- 共同基金行銷費用對基金流量之影響:當投資者對基金績效敏感度不同時賴慧文(Christine W. Lai);吳碧蓉(Bi-Rong Wu)・頁 309–340