The WTO’s Under-Capacity to Deal with Global Over-Capacity
The University of Kansas, School of Law
- 類型
- 論文
- 卷期
- 14卷2期
- 出版
- 2019年03月
- 頁碼
- 1–32
- 編號
- NTUEJ00000102
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摘要
As evidenced by World Trade Organization (hereinafter
“WTO”) reform proposals, efforts are underway to revise critical
features of International Trade Law at the multilateral level. Such
efforts are not in a vacuum. Rather, they are occurring in a global
economic environment characterized in part by structural
imbalances, that is, of over-capacity and consequent overproduction
and trade surpluses and deficits. The European Union (EU) and
Canada suggest reforms concerning disciplines on state owned
enterprises (hereinafter “SOEs”) and subsidies, and enhanced
transparency. But, none of their suggestions has received America’s support in particular, nor garnered a significant consensus among
WTO Members.
That failure may be explained by a basic mismatch: proposals
fail to address global over-capacity in key manufacturing sectors
such as aluminum and steel. Nothing among the reform proposals
would alter materially the dearth of disciplines in the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and WTO on SOEs and
SOEs are a core cause of structural imbalances. They also would
fail to make key changes with respect to constraining subsidies,
bolstering transparency, or enhancing notifications. Accordingly,
the thesis of this article is the WTO suffers from an under-capacity
to deal with over-capacity.
Abstract
As evidenced by World Trade Organization (hereinafter
“WTO”) reform proposals, efforts are underway to revise critical
features of International Trade Law at the multilateral level. Such
efforts are not in a vacuum. Rather, they are occurring in a global
economic environment characterized in part by structural
imbalances, that is, of over-capacity and consequent overproduction
and trade surpluses and deficits. The European Union (EU) and
Canada suggest reforms concerning disciplines on state owned
enterprises (hereinafter “SOEs”) and subsidies, and enhanced
transparency. But, none of their suggestions has received America’s support in particular, nor garnered a significant consensus among
WTO Members.
That failure may be explained by a basic mismatch: proposals
fail to address global over-capacity in key manufacturing sectors
such as aluminum and steel. Nothing among the reform proposals
would alter materially the dearth of disciplines in the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and WTO on SOEs and
SOEs are a core cause of structural imbalances. They also would
fail to make key changes with respect to constraining subsidies,
bolstering transparency, or enhancing notifications. Accordingly,
the thesis of this article is the WTO suffers from an under-capacity
to deal with over-capacity.