權益誘因、盈餘管理與經理人持股變動之關係─權益市值高估代理成本之實證分析
Equity Incentives, Earnings Management and Insider Trading: An Empirical Investigation of the Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity
輔仁大學會計學系(Department of Accounting, Fu Jen Catholic University)
Abstract
This study investigates the empirical implications of the agency theory of overvalued equity (Jensen, 2005). It finds that after controlling for other earnings management incentives, firms with overvalued equity have larger abnormal accruals than non-overvalued firms. Besides, equity incentives provided for managers of overvalued firms exacerbate opportunistic earnings management. I also find that managers with higher equity incentives or undertaking more aggressive earnings management are more likely to take large share selling in the following year and that effects are more pronounced for overvalued firms. This study provides empirical support for the agency theory of overvalued equity (Jensen, 2005), as
Jensen said, "Equity-based compensation cannot solve the problem because it makes the problem worse, not better (for overvalued firms)".
關鍵詞
- 類型
- 論文
- 期刊
- 臺大管理論叢
- ISSN
- 1018-1601
- 卷期
- 19卷S2期
- 出版
- 2009年09月
- 頁碼
- 001–034
- 編號
- NTUEJ00010244
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