臺大學術期刊資料庫NTU Journal Database

供應鏈雙佔結構下的品質競和決策

Competitive or Cooperative Quality Decision in a Duopoly Supply Chain

王志軒;郭瑞祥(R. S. Guo);蔣明晃(David. M. Chiang)

國立臺灣大學商學研究所(Graduate Institute of Business Administration, National Taiwan University);國立臺灣大學商學研究所(Graduate Institute of Business Administration, National Taiwan University)

類型
論文
卷期
17卷1期
出版
2006年12月
頁碼
113–136
編號
NTUEJ00010310
僅書目本篇只提供書目資料,資料庫沒有電子全文。

需要全文時,可以向出版單位洽詢,聯絡方式見期刊資訊。

摘要

本研究探討上游雙佔的製造商如何藉由供貨價格及品質水準,以爭取下游獨買零售商之訂單,並達到利潤最大化的目標;同時將品質對製造商的影響分成兩期;製造商於第一期時因品質投資而產生品質成本,但到了第二期時則因品質效益而降低製造商第二期的生產成本。研究結果發現,當製造商第一期的品質投資對第二期生產成本的減少效果夠顯著時;不論是在競爭性情境下或在合作性情境下,製造商均有誘因來分別改善其品質成本的控制績效或品質成本之合作綜效。其次,競爭性情境下之製造商的邊際利益將恆小於零售商的邊際利益,但在合作性情境下,兩者將會達到相等。另外,面對微利時代的來臨,上游雙佔的對稱製造商面對獨買的零售商時;應採取合作模式,以達成雙贏的局面。

Abstract

This paper discusses a scenario that two upstream manufacturers are assumed to compete for the order simultaneously on price and quality or they may agree to cooperate on quality and simply compete on price. In addition, we assume that the investment of manufacturers on quality improvement in the first period can generate benefit to lower manufacturers' production costs in the second period. Results show that competitive manufacturers(or cooperative manufacturers) may have an incentive to improve their quality cost or quality synergy only when the effect of quality benefit is large enough. Secondly, results show that the margin of competitive manufacturers is always less than the retailer's, but the margin of cooperative manufacturers will be improved to be the same as the retailer's. The managerial implication is that two manufactures facing a single retailer should cooperate with each other to reach a win-win situation, especially when the epoch of micro-profit is coming.

關鍵詞

程式與 AI 助手可以改用資料介面(JSON、MCP),查詢比讀頁面快。給程式與 AI 代理的存取說明