品質提昇技術之專利授權
Licensing Quality-Improving Technologies to a Vertically-Differentiated Market
- 類型
- 論文
- 卷期
- 12卷2期
- 出版
- 2002年06月
- 頁碼
- 035–077
- 編號
- NTUEJ00010378
需要全文時,可以向出版單位洽詢,聯絡方式見期刊資訊。
摘要
本文探討產品創新的專利授權問題,並分析專利授權對市場領先地位的影響。本文發現,對極大化權利金收益的專利擁有者而言,獨家授權往往比多家授權有利,這一結果與實證研究的發現相一致,故本文對獨家授權何以成為常見的商業實務提供了理論性的解釋。至於授權對象的選取則視產品創新類型而異。質言之,若產品創新帶給不同廠商「等量式」的品質提昇 (即技術授權使被授權廠商的產品品質獲得一定量的提昇) ,則專利擁有者會將其研發成果授權給品質領先廠商,並導致市場領先地位的持續。反之,若產品創新造成了「齊觀式」的品質提昇 (即技術授權使被授權廠商的產品品質提昇至某一新水準) ,則專利擁有者會授權其研發成果給品質落後廠商,造成市場領先地位的逆轉。
Abstract
We analyze an independent patent holder's licensing of two kinds of quality-improving technologies to a vertically-differentiated duopoly. We find for both types of technologies that in equilibrium, the patent holder chooses the licensing fee in such a way that only one firm purchases the license. That is, the equilibrium licensing outcome is characterized by an exclusive licensing deal, even though an exclusivity clause is not explicitly imposed. Moreover, we show that depending on the nature of quality-improving technologies available for licensing, both persistence and reversal of quality leadership may arise. In particular, the licensing of a history-dependent technology will result in a persistence of market leadership, whereas the licensing of a history-independent technology will result in a reversal of market leadership.