臺大學術期刊資料庫NTU Journal Database

經濟設計下單票制最適配票策略之研究

A Study on Economical Design for Optimal Votes Allocation Strategy at Single Voting System

盧淵源(Luan-Yuan Lu);黃允成(Yun-Cheng Huang)

國立中山大學企業管理研究所(Department of Business Administraion, National Sun Yat-sen University)

類型
論文
卷期
8卷2期
出版
1997年09月
頁碼
001–032
編號
NTUEJ00010444
外部連結本篇全文由原出版單位的網站提供。

連結出處:C.E.P.S.思博網。連結會開啟本資料庫以外的網站,能否閱讀由該網站決定。

摘要

本文針對組織內之配票建構-穩健配票模型,依此模型可計算出我方規劃人選之穩健配票數及穩當選人數。為達成此配票目標,本文亦發展-數學規劃模型,以期總配票成本最小化。另外,針對以非結構選民為主體之選舉,本文提出以統計抽樣調查為基礎之抽樣設計,估計各候選人之得票數並控制型-誤差。運用數值分析之遞迴運算方法計算最低可當選票數。以我方結構性選民為配票利基,進行槓桿式配票。最後亦建構-數學規劃模型以求解滿足槓桿式配票目標之經濟設計,使總配票成本或總配票困難度最小化。本文亦於文中提出三個與配票有關之定理並加以證明。

Abstract

This paper constructs a conservative votes allocation model for intra-organizational voting. By applying this model, we can calculate the amount of steady elected votes and the number of elects for our party. As to reach the votes allocation purpose, this paper also proposes a mathematical programming model to minimize the total cost or total difficulty for votes allocation. At another situation, if the majority of voters are non-structure, this paper applies a statistical sampling theory to decide the sample size and thus to control the type Ⅰ error. Base on the sample survey, we can estimate the amount of votes for each candidate. By applying the recursive computing method, we can obtain the least votes for elect, then we can adopt leverage votes allocation method for our structural voters. Finally, we also formulate a mathematical model to minimize the total cost or total difficulty for votes allocation. In this paper we propose three theorems for single voting system and prove its existence.

關鍵詞

程式與 AI 助手可以改用資料介面(JSON、MCP),查詢比讀頁面快。給程式與 AI 代理的存取說明