臺大學術期刊資料庫NTU Journal Database

政治遊說對菸品進口關稅的影響

The Political Economy of the Tobacco Taxation

林奇蓉(Chelsea C. Lin);姚淑雯(Shu-Wen Yao);康芳瑜(Fang-Yu Kang);林齋皜(Chai-Hao Lin);洪薏婷(Yi-Ting Hong)

國立東華大學經濟學系(Department of Economics, National Dong Hwa University);國立東華大學經濟學系(Department of Economics, National Dong Hwa University);國立東華大學經濟學系(Department of Economics, National Dong Hwa University);國立東華大學經濟學系(Department of Economics, National Dong Hwa University);國立東華大學經濟學系(Department of Economics, National Dong Hwa University)

類型
論文
卷期
59期
出版
2017年12月
頁碼
49–72
編號
NTUEJ00010600
全文限校內本刊全文只能在臺大校內網路閱讀。

你目前的連線不在校內範圍,所以無法開啟全文。書目與摘要不受限制;回到校內網路後重新整理本頁,全文就會直接顯示。

摘要

相對於利益團體在實際遊說活動中的活躍,目前關於菸品稅的研究鮮少
探討遊說對菸品關稅的影響,而採用理論模型方式探討此議題的文章更
是少見。本文應用Grossman and Helpman(1994)探討在不同情況下利
益團體之遊說對於菸品關稅之影響。本文結果顯示,在大多數的情況
下,政治決定的關稅水準均會偏離最適關稅水準。但若僅考慮本國國內
利益團體的遊說,則兩利益團體的力量相互抵銷,遊說後的關稅政策與
最適關稅相同。本文亦考慮菸商的遊說效率大於環保人士及吸菸者的情
況,在三方遊說下,此時遊說後的關稅政策下降幅度將大於遊說效率一
致時之關稅水準。

Abstract

Compared to the active lobbying activities in the tobacco industries, the
existing literature of tobacco taxation focuses on the impact of tobacco tax
on cigarette consumption. Only few papers consider the role of political
pressure in the formation of tobacco taxes, and none of them address this
issue theoretically. To fill out the gap, this paper applies Grossman and
Helpman’s (1994) menu-auction model to investigate how lobbying
influences the formation of the import tobacco tariff in various cases. The
results of this paper indicate that the politically-determined import tobacco
tariff will be deviated from the optimal tariff in most cases. The
politically-determined import cigarette tariff is the same as the optimal tariff
when only the domestic environmentalists and the smokers simultaneous
lobbying for the tobacco tariffs. The paper also shows that the level of
politically-determined the tariff will be lower when the foreign tobacco firm
is more effective in lobbying.

關鍵詞

程式與 AI 助手可以改用資料介面(JSON、MCP),查詢比讀頁面快。給程式與 AI 代理的存取說明