臺大學術期刊資料庫NTU Journal Database

套利行為、政府執法與國際智慧財產權保護政策

Arbitrage, Enforcement and International Intellectual Property Rights Protection

吳健瑋(Chien-Wei Wu);林億明(Yih-Ming Lin)

國立暨南國際大學經濟學系(Department of Economics, National Chi Nan University);國立嘉義大學應用經濟學系(Department of Applied Economic, National Chiayi University)

類型
論文
卷期
50期
出版
2013年06月
頁碼
99–130
編號
NTUEJ00010635
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摘要

本文建立一個南北國並非完全隔離的智財權保護模型,探討套利行
為如何影響南北兩國智慧財產權保護政策。分析結果發現:北國將
允許部分套利行為的存在,並藉由延長智財權保護時效補償研發者
因套利行為而產生的損失,可以改善研發國家的社會福利。此外,
全球單一智財權標準會影響套利行為存在,並無法使全球社會福利
水準達到極大。

Abstract

This study focuses on the protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs),
examining a North/South model in which market segmentation is
incomplete. We investigate the way in which the existence of arbitrage
affects the incentives of the two countries to set their appropriate duration
of patent protection. Our results show that the North has no incentive to
completely eliminate arbitrage after patents have expired in the South,
despite the fact that enforcement may be costless. The results also reveal
that if the demand function for an innovation is linear, then a noncooperative
game of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exists between the
North and the South. Furthermore, we demonstrate that a uniform universal
standard for IPR protection will never achieve global Pareto efficiency when
markets are not perfectly segmented.

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