自發性合夥關係與共有資源的利用
Self-Induced Partnerships and Utilization of Common Resources
國立台北大學財政學系(Department of Public Finance, National Taipei University);國立台灣經濟研究院產經資料庫(Taiwan Industry Economics Services, Taiwan Institute of Economic Research)
- 類型
- 論文
- 卷期
- 47期
- 出版
- 2011年12月
- 頁碼
- 75–102
- 編號
- NTUEJ00010646
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摘要
如何避免「共有財悲劇」發生,一直以來都是共有資源與共同財產
權研究的焦點。在解決共有資源過度使用問題的討論中,一些學者
認為社會存在透過集體行動(collective action),來促進共有資源利
用效率的誘因。近期,Heintzelman et al. (2009) 即在探討現代社會中
常見的合夥關係,對於共有財產利用的可能影響。然而他們的討論,
是在合夥團體的利益分配法則為外生既定的前提下進行的,另外,
他們也沒有考慮部份人可以不加入合夥團體的情況。為了使分析模
型能夠更加符合現實,本文將調整Heintzelman et al. (2009) 分析架
構中的部份假設,在合夥團體的利益分配法則為內生決定,同時部
份社會成員可以選擇不加入合夥團體的情況下,進一步探究合夥團
體利益分配法則內生決定以及個人的合夥參與決策,在共有資源利
用問題上的經濟與政策意涵。
Abstract
How to circumvent “the tragedy of the commons” has always been a key
issue in common-property research. In the discussion about the abuse of
common resources, some scholars believe that society have an incentive to
improve the efficiency of the common resources utilization by collective
action. Recently, Heintzelman et al. (2009) explore the possible impact of
partnerships in modern society on the utilization of common-property.
However, their discussion is under the premise that the sharing rule of
partnership group is exogenously given and without considering the
possibility of non-participation of certain members. In order to make the
model reflect reality, this research will adjust some hypotheses of
Heintzelman et al. (2009). Under the condition that the sharing rule of
partnership group is endogenously decided and anyone can choose not to
take part in any partnership group, we will investigate the influence of selfinduced
partnerships on the efficiency of the common resources utilization.