最適品質管制下Cournot及Bertrand均衡之效率分析
Optimal Quality Requirements under Cournot and Bertrand Competition
國立中央大學產業經濟研究所(Institute of Industrial Economics, National Central University);國立中央大學經濟學系(Department of Economics, National Central University);國立東華大學經濟學系(Department of Economics, National Dong Hwa University)
- 類型
- 論文
- 卷期
- 46期
- 出版
- 2011年06月
- 頁碼
- 49–83
- 編號
- NTUEJ00010649
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摘要
本文以垂直產品差異化模型,探討最適品質管制下Cournot 及
Bertrand 均衡之效率分析。我們發現在差別管制與單一管制下政府
對廠商的最適品質管制政策隨廠商的市場競爭型態不同。若政府採
差別品質管制,在Bertrand (Cournot) 競爭下,應分別要求高、低品
質廠商提高產品品質(應分別要求高(低)品質廠商提高(降低)
產品品質),縮小(擴大)品質差距。若採取單一品質管制,在Bertrand
(Cournot) 競爭下,會使兩廠商的產品品質均提高,且低品質廠商生
產最低品質標準(應放任廠商自由決定品質)。本文結論除了提供
優質農產品品牌標章制訂參考外,也可提供政府對其他產業品質管
制政策的參考。
Abstract
This paper analyzes the optimal uniform and discriminatory quality
requirements under Cournot and Bertrand competition when two firms
produce high, and low, quality products respectively in a domestic market.
We find that under uniform and discriminatory quality requirements, the
government’s optimal quality requirement depends on the type of
competition in which firms engage. When discriminatory quality
requirements are adopted, the government should ask both high and low
quality firms to raise their quality standard under Bertrand competition and
decrease the quality differentiation. However, the government should ask
the high quality and low quality firm to raise and lower their quality
respectively and increase the quality differentiation under Cournot
competition. When uniform quality requirement is adopted, the government
should set a quality requirement raising both firms’ quality respectively
under Bertrand competition, and the low quality firm will produce at the
lowest quality standard, while under Cournot competition the government
should not set any quality requirement. In addition to premium agricultural
products seal, our results also provide useful strategic recommendations for
the government’s quality policy.