臺大學術期刊資料庫NTU Journal Database

政治獻金能否買到票?─美國糖業政策之個案研究

Can Money buy Votes?- A Case Study of U.S Sugar Policy

江長周(Shun-Yi Shei)

中原大學國際貿易學系(Department of International Trade Chung Yuan Christian University)

卷期
31期
出版
2003年12月
頁碼
079–107
編號
NTUEJ00010718
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摘要

本研究的目的在於提出解釋政治獻金與美國國會議員投票間聯立關係之模型,文中檢驗了三項美國眾議院針對砂糖政策提案的表決結果。實證結果指出我們無法拒絕政治獻金與國會議員投票間具有聯立關係之假說,實證結果並指出議員即使具有農業委員會委員的身分也無法拿到較多的政治獻金。此外,本研究也發現較資淺的議員會收到較多的政治獻金,這隱含著利益團體對資淺議員有長期投資行為的傾向。最後,研究發現,砂糖業者、煙草業者及花生業者間有換票行為發生,而模擬結果顯示出即使利益團體不能捐助政治獻金,美國糖業政策仍然不會被取消。

Abstract

The purpose of this article is to propose a model to explain the simultaneity of campaign contributions and voting. Three U.S. House of Representative votes on sugar amendments are studied. The empirical results suggest that we cannot reject the hypothesis of the simultaneity between campaign contributions from the sweetener producer and user political action committees and House voting on the sugar amendments. The hypothesis that the House Agriculture Committee members receive more money from the sweetener producer and user groups is rejected while the results find that junior members receive more contributions from both groups. This suggests a long-term investment behavior of the two interest groups. The results also show evidence of vote-trading among sugar, tobacco, and peanut farmers. The simulation suggests that the sugar program would remain in place if campaign contributions were not allowed.

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