Petrificus Totalus: The Spell of National Security!
Clarus Law Associates, New Delhi.
摘要
The “national security” exception is a preserve for sovereign narrow structuring of the “security exception” in the post-World War
II era of the GATT, is ill-equipped to consider various emerging
concerns.
A more realistic assessment of the situation therefore is needed to
ensure that there is some streamlining and control of the use of the
security exception. In the interests of predictability and certainty, it
is important that the shroud of “security” does not become a carte
blanche for any form of protectionism.
power which finds a place in the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (hereinafter “GATT”), and practically all subsequent
trade agreements, but has never been tested in a trade dispute. The
reason is simple: while it has been invoked a few times, matters have
never escalated sufficiently for it to be tested.
However, there are currently ten disputes (including eight against
the United States) pending at the World Trade Organization
(hereinafter “WTO”) where the “national security exception” has
been invoked as a defence for WTO-inconsistent policies. The timing
of these disputes in view of the rising protectionism by various
countries in itself raises interesting questions about the intent and
purpose of such an exception, i.e., whether it is a genuine exercise of
the security exception, or a cover for protectionist action.
This article will make an assessment of the wording used in the
security exception under the GATT, and the circumstances wherein
the current spate of disputes has invoked the exception. It will also
reflect on how Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) are addressing this
issue, and the extent to which they are deviating from the language of
the GATT and WTO Agreements.
The article will also explain that it is not correct to attribute rising
national security concerns to the U.S. alone. There is a growing body
of regulatory measures on grounds of national security that are
emerging worldwide. Perhaps the reason for this is because the narrow structuring of the “security exception” in the post-World War
II era of the GATT, is ill-equipped to consider various emerging
concerns.
A more realistic assessment of the situation therefore is needed to
ensure that there is some streamlining and control of the use of the
security exception. In the interests of predictability and certainty, it
is important that the shroud of “security” does not become a carte
blanche for any form of protectionism.
Abstract
The “national security” exception is a preserve for sovereign narrow structuring of the “security exception” in the post-World War
II era of the GATT, is ill-equipped to consider various emerging
concerns.
A more realistic assessment of the situation therefore is needed to
ensure that there is some streamlining and control of the use of the
security exception. In the interests of predictability and certainty, it
is important that the shroud of “security” does not become a carte
blanche for any form of protectionism.
power which finds a place in the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (hereinafter “GATT”), and practically all subsequent
trade agreements, but has never been tested in a trade dispute. The
reason is simple: while it has been invoked a few times, matters have
never escalated sufficiently for it to be tested.
However, there are currently ten disputes (including eight against
the United States) pending at the World Trade Organization
(hereinafter “WTO”) where the “national security exception” has
been invoked as a defence for WTO-inconsistent policies. The timing
of these disputes in view of the rising protectionism by various
countries in itself raises interesting questions about the intent and
purpose of such an exception, i.e., whether it is a genuine exercise of
the security exception, or a cover for protectionist action.
This article will make an assessment of the wording used in the
security exception under the GATT, and the circumstances wherein
the current spate of disputes has invoked the exception. It will also
reflect on how Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) are addressing this
issue, and the extent to which they are deviating from the language of
the GATT and WTO Agreements.
The article will also explain that it is not correct to attribute rising
national security concerns to the U.S. alone. There is a growing body
of regulatory measures on grounds of national security that are
emerging worldwide. Perhaps the reason for this is because the narrow structuring of the “security exception” in the post-World War
II era of the GATT, is ill-equipped to consider various emerging
concerns.
A more realistic assessment of the situation therefore is needed to
ensure that there is some streamlining and control of the use of the
security exception. In the interests of predictability and certainty, it
is important that the shroud of “security” does not become a carte
blanche for any form of protectionism.
關鍵詞
- 類型
- 論文
- 期刊
- Asian Journal of WTO & International Health Law and policy
- ISSN
- 1819-5164
- 卷期
- 13卷2期
- 出版
- 2018年09月
- 頁碼
- 311–332
- 編號
- NTUEJ00000112
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