Anti-Enforcement Loops of Renewable Energy Awards Against Spain: Risks and Anti-Abuse
Assistant professor of Hunan University, at the faculty of law; Ph.D in law degree from Wuhan University, China
摘要
Legal reforms and policy adjustments relating to energy transition have triggered mass claims of investment arbitration. During long-standing disputes, the anti-enforcement actions taken by Spain against renewable energy awards seem to be infinite loops, backed by the European Union (hereinafter “EU”) on intra-EU and state aid grounds. To assess their legality and impacts from the perspectives of interim measures under international law, Spain’s anti-enforcement injunction procedures are less likely to meet legal conditions. They can cause judicial diseconomy and a risk of discrediting the investment arbitration system. Spain’s argument on the application of EU law further carried a risk of violating international law by extraterritorial application, retroactive application and confusing compensation for investment damages with subsidy under World Trade Organization (WTO) law. In order to solve the enforcement dilemma of renewable energy awards, this article recommends settlement negotiations between Spain and the affected investors. To prevent the occurrence of similar “loops” in the long term, policy makers of investment arbitration rules may consider incorporating anti-abuse rules on anti-enforcement injunction by setting up strict prerequisites and minimizing the possibility of granting it on the presumption of bad faith and additional conditions.
Abstract
Legal reforms and policy adjustments relating to energy transition have triggered mass claims of investment arbitration. During long-standing disputes, the anti-enforcement actions taken by Spain against renewable energy awards seem to be infinite loops, backed by the European Union (hereinafter “EU”) on intra-EU and state aid grounds. To assess their legality and impacts from the perspectives of interim measures under international law, Spain’s anti-enforcement injunction procedures are less likely to meet legal conditions. They can cause judicial diseconomy and a risk of discrediting the investment arbitration system. Spain’s argument on the application of EU law further carried a risk of violating international law by extraterritorial application, retroactive application and confusing compensation for investment damages with subsidy under World Trade Organization (WTO) law. In order to solve the enforcement dilemma of renewable energy awards, this article recommends settlement negotiations between Spain and the affected investors. To prevent the occurrence of similar “loops” in the long term, policy makers of investment arbitration rules may consider incorporating anti-abuse rules on anti-enforcement injunction by setting up strict prerequisites and minimizing the possibility of granting it on the presumption of bad faith and additional conditions.
關鍵詞
- 類型
- 論文
- 期刊
- Asian Journal of WTO & International Health Law and policy
- ISSN
- 1819-5164
- 卷期
- 20卷1期
- 出版
- 2025年03月
- 頁碼
- 91–126
- 編號
- NTUEJ00000017
同期目錄
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- Anti-Enforcement Loops of Renewable Energy Awards Against Spain: Risks and Anti-AbuseLiping Huang・頁 91–126
- How to Balance International Trade and Public Health in the Face of Emerging Infectious Diseases? — Reflections and Research Based on the Implementation of “Additional Health Measures” in COVID-19Yi Tang・頁 127–176
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