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要不要臉?:列維納斯倫理內的動物性

Losing Face?: The Animality in Levinas's Ethics

梁孫傑(Sun-chieh Liang)

國立師範大學英語學系(Department of English, NTNU)

類型
專題論文
卷期
36卷4期
出版
2007年12月
頁碼
191–239
編號
NTUEJ00001756
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摘要

列維納斯對於動物是否擁有面貌的議題,抱持猶疑不決的態度。許多學者據此抨擊他的倫理哲學只關懷人類而將其他萬事萬物都排除在外。本篇論文除整理分析各家看法之外,擬就列維納斯的倫理思維內有關動物性的部分,進行綜合歸納,探究其成因和作用,並用以解釋列維納斯謹言慎語的治學態度。論文擬將討論方向鎖定在三個層面:(1)回顧並檢視學界對列維納斯動物議題反對和支持的立場,主張兩造齟齬乃根源於列維納斯對動物模稜兩可的曖昧立場;(2)曖昧的動物性在我和他者建立倫理關係時的關鍵作用;(3)以《塔木德》〈贖罪篇85a〉為例,對照列維納斯的倫理哲學,藉以說明被忽略的動物,如同無法趨近的上帝,才是倫理責任的濫觴。

Abstract

Levinas is not certain whether an animal has a face; because of this incertitude, many scholars express doubts about his ethical philosophy and make the criticism that he is concerned solely about human beings, excluding “others” (beings or non-beings) as beyond the boundary of ethical concern. Following a general review of scholarly assessments of Levinas's attitude towards animals, this paper purports to argue that Levinas's ethical diffidence toward animals in fact arises from his scrupulous philosophical stance. The argument is framed in three dimensions: (1) the pros and cons in the scholarly assessments of Levinas's position rest on a deliberate ambiguity embedded in Levinas's ethical philosophy; (2) the crucial position of animality in the encounter between the I and the Other; (3) by using “Tractate Yoma 85a” (Talmud) as an example, this paper argues that the neglected animals, like the unapproachable God, can be the beginning of the ethical responsibility.

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