Looking Outside or Looking Inside?: The Effects of Trade Bureaucracy Design on Trade Dispute Behavior
Jung Hyun Han: Public policy specialist (consultant), Climate Change and Sustainable Development Department, Asian Development Bank (ADB), Ph.D. in Public Policy
RyuGyung Park: Ph.D. candidate, Department of Political Science, University of California – Davis
摘要
How do different bureaucratic designs affect international trade dispute patterns in the World Trade Organization (WTO)? While previous research has explored various determinants of trade policies and the role of bureaucracy in policy formulations, the effects of the bureaucratic structure of trade agencies on formal trade litigations have not yet been addressed. We hypothesize that when the commerce and industry ministry (hereinafter “CI ministry”) oversees trade policies, it pursues more aggressive trade dispute strategies, compared to when the foreign affairs ministry (hereinafter “FA ministry”) is in charge. Meanwhile, we expect independent trade agencies to behave similarly as foreign affairs ministries in terms of trade dispute strategies. We examine the trade disputes raised between G20 countries and test the effect of trade bureaucracy structure on the level of aggressiveness pursued by the complainant country. Our results show that when the CI ministry oversees trade policies, trade disputes are more likely to be extended to a higher level of conflict resolution. FA ministry and an independent agency do not show any statistical difference.
Abstract
How do different bureaucratic designs affect international trade dispute patterns in the World Trade Organization (WTO)? While previous research has explored various determinants of trade policies and the role of bureaucracy in policy formulations, the effects of the bureaucratic structure of trade agencies on formal trade litigations have not yet been addressed. We hypothesize that when the commerce and industry ministry (hereinafter “CI ministry”) oversees trade policies, it pursues more aggressive trade dispute strategies, compared to when the foreign affairs ministry (hereinafter “FA ministry”) is in charge. Meanwhile, we expect independent trade agencies to behave similarly as foreign affairs ministries in terms of trade dispute strategies. We examine the trade disputes raised between G20 countries and test the effect of trade bureaucracy structure on the level of aggressiveness pursued by the complainant country. Our results show that when the CI ministry oversees trade policies, trade disputes are more likely to be extended to a higher level of conflict resolution. FA ministry and an independent agency do not show any statistical difference.
關鍵詞
- 類型
- 論文
- 期刊
- Asian Journal of WTO & International Health Law and policy
- ISSN
- 1819-5164
- 卷期
- 20卷1期
- 出版
- 2025年03月
- 頁碼
- 209–248
- 編號
- NTUEJ00000020
同期目錄
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- How to Balance International Trade and Public Health in the Face of Emerging Infectious Diseases? — Reflections and Research Based on the Implementation of “Additional Health Measures” in COVID-19Yi Tang・頁 127–176
- General Public Policy Exceptions in International Investment Agreements (IIAs): Opportunities and Challenges in Times of Global Health CrisisJiabao Duan・頁 177–208
- Looking Outside or Looking Inside?: The Effects of Trade Bureaucracy Design on Trade Dispute BehaviorJung Hyun Han & RyuGyung Park・頁 209–248