智的直覺與想像力 ─牟宗三與海德格論有限性
Intellectual Intuition and Imagination: Mou Zongsan and Heidegger on Finitude
- 卷期
- 45期
- 出版
- 2013年03月
- 頁碼
- 141–186
- 編號
- NTUEJ00002443
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摘要
牟宗三的康德詮釋重視「智的直覺」,海德格的康德詮釋則重視「想像
力」,兩者看似互不相干,其實隱藏著一場有限與無限的角力。海德格在《康
德與形而上學問題》指出認知一般之本質在於直觀,而感性直觀的接受性正
是人類認知有限性的根源。概括來說,就是以下兩個命題:(1)人只有感性
直觀;(2)人是有限的。牟宗三在《智的直覺與中國哲學》譯述了《康德書》
的相關內容,並且宣稱兩個對反於海德格的命題:(1)人可有智的直覺;(2)
人雖有限而可無限。牟宗三企圖突破海德格劃下的界線,肯定人有「智的直
覺」,可以創造「物自身」。在本文的分析下,這個看來沿襲康德術語的說法,
不過是說一種「心」與「物」的關係:心表現為覺潤之情,可以賦予事物以
價值。
不過,即使如此,亦無法說明人有無限性,牟宗三的宣稱無疑是誇大其
辭。海德格會批評,牟宗三將存在論設置於「時間」範圍以外,企圖以一個
無限的本體為憑藉,活出不朽的意義,這注定是虛妄。海德格在《康德書》
標舉想像力,目的在於揭示人是感性與知性兼具的存在者,無時空性的概念
必須經過想像力的作用─「圖式化」─為概念注入時空元素,才具備認知意義。在這個意義下,知性離不開感性,自發性亦離不開接受性,說到底,
人的理性能力始終離不開有限性。在海德格的挑戰之下,牟宗三宣稱的「無
限心」恐怕是難以成立的。
Abstract
beyond the line delimited by Heidegger. Therefore,
Mou thinks that human beings should have “intellectual intuition” and thus
they are able to create “thing-in-itself”. In this paper, I try to argue that
Mou’s doctrine is not a reformulation of Kant’s philosophy, but an
illustration of a relation between “heart-mind” and “thing”: Heart-mind is an
ability to bestow value on other things.Despite Mou’s doctrine is not as radical as we may think, we can still
consider that he exaggerates the status of human beings. Mou puts his
ontology out of time and he regards an infinite noumenon as the ground of
his ontology. In Heidegger’s opinion, this is doomed to failure. In Kantbook,
Heidegger highlights the concept of imagination in order to show that human
beings are both sensible and intellectual. Any concept is worth to be cognized
only if it goes through a procedure by imagination─schematized─and then they
have spatial-temporal elements. In this sense, there is not a separation between
understanding and sensibility, spontaneity and receptivity. All in all, human
capacity to reason cannot separated from finitude. Under Heidegger’s
challenge, Mou’s radical claim on “infinite heart-mind” seems not possible
to stand firm.