實踐理由之動機結構
The Motivational Structure in Practical Reason
中央研究院歐美研究所副研究員(Associate Research Fellow, Institute of European and American Studies, Academia Sinica.)
- 卷期
- 44期
- 出版
- 2012年10月
- 頁碼
- 073–102
- 編號
- NTUEJ00002446
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摘要
有關行動理由的哲學爭辯常聚焦於理由與動機之關連,內在論主張行動
理由與動機事實有必要之聯結,外在論則否認。1980 年,威廉斯發表論文
“Internal and External Reasons”,提出反對外在論的強力論證,引發了倫理
學、行動理論以及理由理論一連串深具影響力的辯論。二十年後,他發表
“Some Further Notes on Internal and External Reasons”(2001),精進他的休謨
理論以回應這些年來其他學者所提出的質詢;更重要的是,他將過去二十多
年來的主要批評歸類為兩種進路:「康德進路」以及「亞理斯多德進路」,並
且對二者提出強烈反對。本文檢視康德進路及亞理斯多德進路近來的可能發
展,其中包括柯思嘉和麥克道爾的哲學論述,以解釋並論證為何威廉斯的最
新論點不足以反駁此二進路。
Abstract
A central issue in the contemporary philosophy of action focuses on the
relation between reason and motivation: Internalism holds, while Externalism
denies, that there is a necessary connection between reasons for action and
motivational states. In 1980, Bernard Williams launched a powerful argument
against Externalism in his article, “Internal and External Reasons,” which
triggered influential debates in ethics, action theory, and theory of reason.
Twenty years later Williams published “Some Further Notes on Internal and
External Reasons” (2001), in which he refined his Humean theory so as to
accommodate the many criticisms he had so far received. More importantly,
he classified his major critics, in the past two decades, mainly into two groups,
“the Kantian” and “the Aristotelian,” and raised objections to both. This paper
explores the later development of the Kantian and the Aristotelian approaches,
primarily in terms of the recent works of Christine Korsgaard and John McDowell,
and argues to the effect that Williams’ objections are insufficient to refute the
two approaches.