論瑣碎性結果與對條件化的限制
On the Triviality Results and the Restriction on Conditionalization
中央研究院歐美研究所(Institute of European and American Studies, Academia Sinica)
- 卷期
- 41期
- 出版
- 2011年03月
- 頁碼
- 113–134
- 編號
- NTUEJ00002461
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摘要
路易士的「瑣碎性結果」論證被視為能有力地拒斥對於條件句採行的真值條件語意論,因為如果接受古典的機率理論、條件化,以及史東內克對條件句的論點,我們可以推導出一個荒謬的結果─對任意的命題A 與C 而言,p(C/A) = p(C)。本文試圖回應他的「瑣碎性結果」論證,並指出:無論我們以條件機率如何定義自然語言的任何二位連接詞,瑣碎性結果仍會出現。因此,放棄史東內克對條件句的論點不是避開瑣碎性結果的唯一方式;相反的,我們可以對「條件化」做適當的限制來避免瑣碎性結果。
Abstract
Lewis’s arguments for the triviality results are considered as a powerful rejection of the truth-conditional accounts of conditionals: the absurd consequence that for any propositions A and C, p(C/A) = p(C) is derived from the classical probability calculus, conditionalization, and Stalnaker’s semantics for conditionals.
In this paper, it is argued that the triviality results need not be a threat to Stalnaker’s semantics, for we can derive a generalized triviality result from the classical probability theory and any thesis about conditional probability. The lesson, I suggest, is that we should reconsider the classical probability theory or set a restriction on the rule of conditionalization such that the triviality results may be avoided.