臺大學術期刊資料庫NTU Journal Database

推論證成與遵循規則

Inferential Justification and Rule-Following

何志青(Jih-Ching Ho)

中央研究院歐美研究所副研究員(Associate Research Fellow, Institute of European and American Studies, Academia Sinica)

卷期
38期
出版
2009年10月
頁碼
063–090
編號
NTUEJ00002473
全文限校內本刊全文只能在臺大校內網路閱讀。

你目前的連線不在校內範圍,所以無法開啟全文。書目與摘要不受限制;回到校內網路後重新整理本頁,全文就會直接顯示。

摘要

傳統知識論接受推論之證成概念:一信念的證成是藉由其他的信念(或狀態)合理推出該信念。推論證成立即導致「無限後退」的問題,因為具證成能力的信念(或狀態)本身亦需要被證成。本文嘗試提出不會無限後退的推論證成。首先分析傳統推論證成理論具有三原則:狹義推理理論,形式主義的推理概念,以及單線後退的證成方向。此三原則必須被修正,並取代之以新原則:廣義推理理論、實質主義、平衡互動的證成方向。這些原則所組成的新推論證成理論不再有無限後退的問題。

Abstract

Traditional epistemology embraces an inferential concept of justification: a belief is justified just in case it can be reasonably inferred from other beliefs. Inferential justification immediately incurs the problem of infinite regress, since the justifying beliefs themselves are in need of further justification. In this paper I will try to explicate a new idea of inferential justification that does not regress indefinitely. I will begin by analyzing the traditional notion of inferential justification as involving three principles, namely narrow inferentialism, formalism, and linear regress justification. All three principles are critically examined, and in their place, three new ones are proposed: broad inferentialism, materialism, and interactive justification. The principles constitute a new inferential approach which admits of no infinite regress.

關鍵詞

程式與 AI 助手可以改用資料介面(JSON、MCP),查詢比讀頁面快。給程式與 AI 代理的存取說明