論盲目實在論
On Blind Realism
國立清華大學哲學研究所(Graduate Institute of Philosophy, National Tsing Hua University)
- 卷期
- 25期
- 出版
- 2002年01月
- 頁碼
- 105–135
- 編號
- NTUEJ00002526
摘要
阿梅達(Robert Almeder)的盲目實在論主要有三點主張:放棄真理符應說,我們仍然可以知道外在世界之存在;我們具有關於世界的正確信念;但我們卻無法指出哪些信念是正確的。本文之目的,便是要檢視阿氏為其盲目實在論所提出的論證。一方面,我們試圖指出:阿的論證。一方面,我們試圖指出:阿證,是基於對裴爾士(Peirce)的誤解;而且論證本身也是站不住腳的。另一方面,阿氏對第二點主張的論證是不足的,而且即使他對T2的證明是成立的,也與他的第三點主張不相容。因此,盲目實在論是不成立的。
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to critically examine the following main theses of Almeder’s blind realism: (T1) Even if we abandon the correspondence theory of truth, we would still know that there is an external world. (T2) At any time, some of our presently completely authorized beliefs about the external world must correctly describe the external world. (T3) We cannot justifiably pick out which of our presently completely authorized beliefs do correctly describe the external world. I try to show that Almeder’s argument for T1 is based upon his misunderstanding of Peirce’s well-known Harvard experiment and it also fails to support T1. Moreover, T2 is not well elaborated and, even worse, incoherent with T3.