推演論,概念論,及社會實踐論
Inferentialism, Conceptualism, and Social Pragmatism
國立清華大學哲學研究所(Graduate Institute of Philosophy, National Tsing Hua University)
- 卷期
- 25期
- 出版
- 2002年01月
- 頁碼
- 137–175
- 編號
- NTUEJ00002527
摘要
我們的心智如何掌握世界?最近之相關哲學論述的主要關懷是要指出事實、經驗和判斷之間具有某種證成之關係。本論文檢視三個經驗證成之理論:推演論、概念論及社會錢行論。此三理論不同於傳統之基礎論、融貫論及社會踐行論。此三理論不同於傳統之基礎論、融貫論及可靠論,在於它們不企圖對知識論概念(如「知識」和「理據」)提供抽象之分析;這些新興理論深受維根斯坦之影響,強調知識概念與「語言踐行」之密切關連。本文首先說明推演論與概念論之間的論爭,釐清其主要論證和反駁,最後展述社會踐行論,並指出其對演論與概念論之修正及補強。
Abstract
How do our minds grasp the world? The major task in explaining the relation between mind and the world is to indicate how facts, experiences, and judgments stand in justificatory relation. This paper examines three ways of explaining the cognitive relation. This paper examines three ways of explaining the cognitive relation between mind and world: inferentialism, conceptualism, and social pragmatism. These three theories differ from the traditional foundationalism, coherentism, and reliabilism in that they no longer attempt any analysis of the epistemic notions such as knowledge and evidence abstractly; rather, they explore, in a Wittgensteinean way, these notions in relation to linguistic notions such as knowledge and evidence abstractly; rather, they explore, in a Wittgensteinean way, these notions in relation to linguistic practices. In this paper, I will first examine the debate between inferentialism and conceptualism, a debate involving Sellars, Davidson, McDowell, and Brandom. I will show that both inferentialism and conceptualism have difficulties in giving a complete account of empirical justification and that their difficulties can be remedied only by resorting to some social pragmatism notions such as the social development of conceptual capacities and the social recognition of cognitive performance.