臺大學術期刊資料庫NTU Journal Database

舒茲論純粹我們關係

Schutz on Pure We-Relationship

游淙祺(Chung-chi Yu)

東吳大學哲學系( Department of Philosophy, Soochow University)

卷期
25期
出版
2002年01月
頁碼
261–276
編號
NTUEJ00002530
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連結出處:國立臺灣大學哲學系。連結會開啟本資料庫以外的網站,能否閱讀由該網站決定。

摘要

本文旨在探討舒茲的「純粹我們關係」概念,本文的出發點在於認識到此概念往往被當作「具體我們關係」而致其涵義未能被適切的理解。本文指出,舒茲將「純粹我們關係」茵定在「對你態度」之上,並視之為「極限概念」,亦即將它當作無任何具體內容的抽象概念,而且主張它是任何社會關係的最終基礎。此一論述導致理念與自我中心化的批評。本文指出,舒茲此一觀點在晚期的生活世界論述中依然保留,並試著指出上一概念所導致的批評或許可以藉由「相互準備投入關係」來加以化解。

Abstract

An inquiry into the “pure we-relationship” in Schutz is attempted. In his early major work The Phenomenology of the Social World Schutz regards the “pure we-relationship” as the ultimate foundation of the social world. Because of the confusion with “concrete we-relationship,” its meaning remains misunderstood among many interpreters. While this concept is rooted in “Thou-orientation” and is regarded as formal concept without any content, Schutz is criticized for having taken up an idealistic and agocentric position in his lifeworld theory that he develops in late thought. Instead, I suggest that we might save him from such criticism by introducing the “mutual tuning-in relationship.”

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