詮釋學循環:史萊瑪赫、海德格和高達美
On the Hermeneutic Circle of Schleiermacher, Heidegger and Gadamer
國立臺灣大學哲學系(Department of Philosophy , National Taiwan University)
- 卷期
- 23期
- 出版
- 2000年01月
- 頁碼
- 097–136
- 編號
- NTUEJ00002542
摘要
史萊瑪赫、海德格的〈存有與時間〉和高達美都曾討論詮釋學循環的概念。雖然海德格認為他的詮釋學循環是瞭解(Verstehen, understanding)本身的結構,但本文要指出,它依然擁有史萊瑪赫詮釋學循環的性格--一個方法論的概念。這是說,兩者都是用以證實一個結論。另一方面,高達美雖號稱其詮釋學循環來自海德格哲學,不過,本文卻要指出高達美的詮釋學循環,已完全擺脫方法論的意涵,因為它不是用以證實一個結論,而是讓真理得以出現。
Abstract
The concept of hermeneutic circle appears in the works of Schleierrmacher, Heidegger and Gadamer. In this essay I argue that although Heidegger, in Being and Time, thinks that his concept of hermeneutic circle belongs to the structure of understanding, it still possesses a characteristic of Schleiermacher's hermeneutic circle, namely, both of them are methodological concepts. However, although Gadamer claims that his concept of hermeneutic circle is developed out of Heidegger's philosophy, I show that it is no longer a methodological concept, but is the happening of truth.