臺大學術期刊資料庫NTU Journal Database

人格同一與存活

Personal Identity and Survival

黃懿梅(Yih-Mei Huang)

國立臺灣大學哲學系(Department of Philosophy , National Taiwan University)

卷期
20期
出版
1997年06月
頁碼
051–074
編號
NTUEJ00002566
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連結出處:國立臺灣大學哲學系。連結會開啟本資料庫以外的網站,能否閱讀由該網站決定。

Abstract

D. Lewis asserts that ‘We can agree with Parfit...that what matters in questions of personal identity is mental continuity or connectedness...At same time we can consistently agree with common sense...that what matters in questions of personal identity is identity’, but D. Parfit believes that this cannot be done. The aim of this paper is to re-examine whether Lewis's thesis, ‘the I-relation and the R-relation coincide’, had been justified. In sections 2 and 3, I summarized Lewi’s and Parfit's arguments separately. And the related cohabitationist's theory is introduced in section 4. After the discussion in section 5, I argue that Lewis's thesis cannot be justified.

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