臺大學術期刊資料庫NTU Journal Database

權利為本的道德理論之限制與價值

The Limit and Value of Right-Based Moral Theories

羅秉祥(Ping-cheung Lo)

卷期
19期
出版
1996年01月
頁碼
255–284
編號
NTUEJ00002576
外部連結本篇全文由原出版單位的網站提供。

連結出處:國立臺灣大學哲學系。連結會開啟本資料庫以外的網站,能否閱讀由該網站決定。

Abstract

Ronald Dworkin introduces a tripartite classification into political theories viz, duty-based, goal-based, and right-based theories. J. L. Mackie extends this classification into moral theores. He argues that in addition to duty-based moral theories (e.g., Kant's theory) and goal-based moral theories (e.g., Utilitarianism), a right-based moral theory is both conceptually possible and morally more desirable. This paper first attempts to analyze the characteristics of Mackie's right-based moral theory in particular, and any right-based moral theory in general. The present author then contends that there are three major weaknesses of such theories: (1)They over-simplify the relation between duties and rights; (2)they fail to provide adequate guidance to moral life; (3)they cannot account for the true moral significance of supererogation and virtue. Accordingly, the present author agrees that a right-based moral theory is morally truncated and impoverished. It captures only a minimalist ethics. This is because there is a two-fold fundamental error of a right based moral theory, viz., it misplaces the moral subject, and it captures the point or object of morality only partially. The rejection of a right-based moral theory does not imply a rejection of rights. On the contrary, this paper continues to argue for the importance of rights in moral life, and the priority of rights over duties in some cases. In other words, though rights cannot furnish the sufficient basis of morality, it does provide its necessary basis.

程式與 AI 助手可以改用資料介面(JSON、MCP),查詢比讀頁面快。給程式與 AI 代理的存取說明