臺大學術期刊資料庫NTU Journal Database

論洛克哲學中的知識、觀念與確定性

On Knowledge, Idea, and Certainy in John Locke

蔡信安(Denis Hsin-an Tsai)

國立臺灣大學哲學系(Department of Philosophy , National Taiwan University)

卷期
18期
出版
1995年01月
頁碼
035–060
編號
NTUEJ00002579
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Abstract

In his Essay, John Locke contends, "since the mind, in all its thoughts and reasonings, hath no other immediate object but its own ideas, … out knowledge is only conversant about them." But it is inconsistent with his realism, since the object of human knowledge is the external world itself rather than the idea in the mind. Thus, how can he be sure that he has knowledge of the world?
In this paper, the author deals with Locke's concept of knowledge by an investigation of the problem in ideas which is related to criteria of truth.
The paper is divded into two parts. The first part deals with Locke's metaphysics. The author contends that Locke develops his theory of knowledge in order to justify his religious faith and metaphysics. Locke is a realist. He establishes his theory of knowledge by way of way of idea. But he does not trust the ability of senses. Mind cannot know the real essence of the material substance. Thus, how can he claim that he knows things, since his theory of truth is of correspondence rather than of cohence?
The second part of the paper clarifies Locke's problem of certainty in terms of origin, nature and division of idea. The author contends that Locke holds a causal theory of perception, since he uses the correspondence theory of truth. But It does not help Locke to get rid of the challenge of scepticism in natural science. In mathematics and morals, Locke believes that the human knowledge can be certain.

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