臺大學術期刊資料庫NTU Journal Database

多元價值和「對」的優先性

Pluralism and the Priority of Right

林火旺(Huo-Wang Lin)

國立臺灣大學哲學系(Department of Philosophy , National Taiwan University)

卷期
15期
出版
1992年01月
頁碼
035–052
編號
NTUEJ00002607
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連結出處:國立臺灣大學哲學系。連結會開啟本資料庫以外的網站,能否閱讀由該網站決定。

Abstract

John Rawls argues, in his renowned book A Theory of Justice, that the concept of right is prior to the concept of the good. It seems the underlying idea is that he takes the diversity of comprehensive philosophical or moral doctrines as an enduring fact of the public culture of the contemporary constitutional democracy. Therefore, he attempts to construct his conception of juctice without presupposing any particular comprehensive ideal of the good. This article tries to show that Rawls does assume a controversial conception of the good, namely, the individualistic ideal of the person, as one of premises in developing his theory of justice. In other words, Rawls cannot consistently holds the priority of right over the good.

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