臺大學術期刊資料庫NTU Journal Database

論外在理論

Extenalism

黃懿梅(Yih-Mei Huang)

國立臺灣大學哲學系(Department of Philosophy , National Taiwan University)

卷期
15期
出版
1992年01月
頁碼
101–126
編號
NTUEJ00002609
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連結出處:國立臺灣大學哲學系。連結會開啟本資料庫以外的網站,能否閱讀由該網站決定。

Abstract

One basic problem of epistemic justification is the regress problem. The externalist attempts to solve the regress problem by claiming that the acceptance of beliefs satifying the externalist conditions is epistemically justified. They claim that the person for whom the belief is justified need not himself has any cognitive grasp at all of the reasons. This paper introduces D.M. Armstrong's and A. Goldman's theories and analyses the arguments in favor of or against the theories. I argue that externalism is not sufficient for epistemic justification.

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