臺大學術期刊資料庫NTU Journal Database

物理論與感值

Physicalism and Qualia

黃懿梅(Yih-Mei Huang)

國立臺灣大學哲學系(Department of Philosophy , National Taiwan University)

卷期
13期
出版
1990年01月
頁碼
161–184
編號
NTUEJ00002633
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連結出處:國立臺灣大學哲學系。連結會開啟本資料庫以外的網站,能否閱讀由該網站決定。

Abstract

Any reductive analysis of the mental cannot captural the subjective character of experience. So the qualia is not analyzable in terms of any explanatory system of physical states. This paper includes three parts.
1. T. Nagel's what it is like argument' and F. Jackson's 'knowledge argument' argue that physicalism cannot give any explanation of the subjective qualities of our experiences and any physical informations cannot explain what red looks like.
2. An analysis and critique of the defenses of physicalism.
3. The argument against physicalism (identity theory) is an invalid argument.

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