臺大學術期刊資料庫NTU Journal Database

哈曼的道德相對論

Gilbert Harman's Moral Relativism

林火旺(Huo-Wang Lin)

國立臺灣大學哲學系(Department of Philosophy , National Taiwan University)

卷期
13期
出版
1990年01月
頁碼
363–374
編號
NTUEJ00002640
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連結出處:國立臺灣大學哲學系。連結會開啟本資料庫以外的網站,能否閱讀由該網站決定。

Abstract

Gilbert Harman firmly believes that his moral theory, first published in his paper "Moral Relativism Defended" has succeeded in defending moral Relativism which has been previously attacked as being inconsistent. Harman claims that his version of moral relativism is a thesis concerning the logical form of a certain kind of moral judgments, i. e., inner judgments. Although Harman's moral relativism avoids the charge of inconsistency, it is not free from serious defects. In this article, I embark on evaluating some crucial points which underlie Harman's theory.

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