臺大學術期刊資料庫NTU Journal Database

杜威的經驗自然主義

John Dewey's Empirical Naturalism

郭博文(Po-wen Kuo)

國立臺灣大學哲學系(Department of Philosophy , National Taiwan University)

卷期
11期
出版
1988年01月
頁碼
051–080
編號
NTUEJ00002659
外部連結本篇全文由原出版單位的網站提供。

連結出處:國立臺灣大學哲學系。連結會開啟本資料庫以外的網站,能否閱讀由該網站決定。

Abstract

This paper is an attempt to expound and clarify the main points of Dewey’s naturalistic metaphysics. Section one deals with Dewey’s definition of metaphysics as a study of the generic traits of existence and takes issue with Hook's and Rorty’s negative view concerning Dewey’s enterprise. Section two deals with Dewey’s empirical method, in which such key concepts as “primary experience” and “selective emphasis” are examined. Section three deals with Dewey’s substantive metaphysical theories, using his treatment of the mind-body problem as a typical example. Section four deals with four generic traits of nature found or implied in Dewey’s metaphysical works: change, quality, interaction and continuity. Section five defends Dewey’s position against some criticisms raised by Santayana, Cohen and others, while at the same time points out that Dewey’s concept of “primary experience” is ambiguous and that his purely functional approach to natural existences is one-sided.

程式與 AI 助手可以改用資料介面(JSON、MCP),查詢比讀頁面快。給程式與 AI 代理的存取說明