臺大學術期刊資料庫NTU Journal Database

論道德推理

Moral Reasoning: A Discussion with John Searle Concerning "Is" and "Ought"

楊樹同(Shu-Tong Yang)

卷期
11期
出版
1988年01月
頁碼
081–106
編號
NTUEJ00002660
外部連結本篇全文由原出版單位的網站提供。

連結出處:國立臺灣大學哲學系。連結會開啟本資料庫以外的網站,能否閱讀由該網站決定。

Abstract

After a brief historical survey of the Is-Ought question, this paper takes issue with John Searler’s important 1964 article ‘How to Derive “Ought” from “Is”. ’ Searle tries to derive “ought” from “is” through an analysis of speech act of making a promise. Searle claims that a promise is a fact (what he calls an institutional fact), but in making a promise, a person is committed to carrying out what is promised, that is to say, he is also making an evaluation. Searle’s point is that through this speech act analysis, he is able to derive an “ought” conclusion from premises which are purely factual statements. The present paper argues that whether one has to carry out what one promises depends on the content of the promise. However, in order to decide whether one should keep the promise, one has to appeal to one’s own moral principles. In other words, there are evaluative elements hidden in Searle’s so-called factual premises. Searle’s attempt to derive “ought” from “is” is thus shown to be unsuccessful.

程式與 AI 助手可以改用資料介面(JSON、MCP),查詢比讀頁面快。給程式與 AI 代理的存取說明