臺大學術期刊資料庫NTU Journal Database

論維根斯坦的哲學方法

On Wittgenstein's Method of Philosophy

蔡信安(Denis Hsin-an Tsai)

國立臺灣大學哲學系(Department of Philosophy , National Taiwan University)

卷期
11期
出版
1988年01月
頁碼
143–158
編號
NTUEJ00002663
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連結出處:國立臺灣大學哲學系。連結會開啟本資料庫以外的網站,能否閱讀由該網站決定。

Abstract

A method of philosophy is not independent from a conception of philosophy. The way of understanding Wittgenstein’s method of philosophy is in his Philosophical Investigations. He says, “The philosopher’s treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness” (Sec. 255). And, “The problems are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always know. Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language. ” (Sec. 109). That is to say, Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy is that philosophy is not a doctrine of reality, but a treatment of illness which is arised from human life. The treatment is out of his theories of language. This paper deals with his two different prescriptions in two books, i. e., Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and Philosophical Investigations. The author contends that it is one method, that is, “by means of language”, and one aim, “die Loesung des Problems des Lebens. ”

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