論維根斯坦的哲學方法
On Wittgenstein's Method of Philosophy
國立臺灣大學哲學系(Department of Philosophy , National Taiwan University)
- 卷期
- 11期
- 出版
- 1988年01月
- 頁碼
- 143–158
- 編號
- NTUEJ00002663
Abstract
A method of philosophy is not independent from a conception of philosophy. The way of understanding Wittgenstein’s method of philosophy is in his Philosophical Investigations. He says, “The philosopher’s treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness” (Sec. 255). And, “The problems are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always know. Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language. ” (Sec. 109). That is to say, Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy is that philosophy is not a doctrine of reality, but a treatment of illness which is arised from human life. The treatment is out of his theories of language. This paper deals with his two different prescriptions in two books, i. e., Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and Philosophical Investigations. The author contends that it is one method, that is, “by means of language”, and one aim, “die Loesung des Problems des Lebens. ”