臺大學術期刊資料庫NTU Journal Database

海德格〈存有與時間〉的世界性概念

The Concept of Worldhood in Heidegger's Being and Time

陳榮華(Wing-Wah Chan)

國立臺灣大學哲學系(Department of Philosophy , National Taiwan University)

卷期
10期
出版
1987年01月
頁碼
177–198
編號
NTUEJ00002674
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連結出處:國立臺灣大學哲學系。連結會開啟本資料庫以外的網站,能否閱讀由該網站決定。

Abstract

This essay attempts to clarify the concept of worldhood in Heidegger’s Being and Time. The author suggests that this concept may be interpreted in two different approaches. Firstly, it is called ontological approach. Here, worldhood is the a priori ground for the “presence” of the entities within-the-world. Accordingly, the function of worldhood is “letting-be” of entities which is not Dasein. Secondly, it is called epistemological approach. In this approach, worldhood is the a priori ground for the meaning of the entities within-the-world. Accordingly, the function of worldhood is to give meaning. It is in this approach that Heidegger takes the constitutive of worldhood as significance. But, why does Heidegger adopt the second approach instead of the first one? The author suggests that it is because in Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein, which is usually treated as existential or ontological analysis, is actually an analysis of the disclosedness of Dasein. If it is correct, then in his interpretation of worldhood, would Heidegger certainly emphasize its role in Dasein’s disclosedness. Therefore, Heidegger adopts the second approach.

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