Reconstructing Enforcement in Global Health Law: Sovereignty, Incentives, and the Structural Limits of the International Health Regulations
Mohammad Omar Alhejaili, Associate Prof. of Law at the Faculty of Shariah & Law, University of Tabuk, Saudi Arabia
Ibrahim Mathker Saleh Alotaibi, Associate Prof. of Law at the Faculty of Shariah & Law, University of Tabuk, Saudi Arabia
摘要
Global health governance operates through a legal framework that appears binding but, in practice, functions as voluntary cooperation. The International Health Regulations (2005) (hereinafter “IHR”) exemplify this contradiction. During COVID-19, states delayed notification, imposed unscientific travel restrictions, and selectively relied on World Health Organization (hereinafter “WHO”) guidance without legal consequence. These outcomes reflect structural design rather than isolated shortcomings. The IHR preserves sovereign discretion, denies the WHO juridical authority, and relies on epistemic legitimacy rather than enforceable obligations.
Three claims are advanced. First, doctrinal analysis shows that the IHR lacks compulsory jurisdiction, authoritative fact-finding, and remedial mechanisms, rendering compliance formally mandatory but substantively voluntary. Second, comparative institutional analysis demonstrates that enforceability in regimes such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) stems from sovereignty-limiting commitments and reciprocal incentives that the IHR intentionally avoid; the comparison illuminates institutional design, but its incentive structure—anchored in market access and retaliatory remedies—has no equivalent in global health. Third, insights from political economy and Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) reveal that disclosure duties generate disproportionate economic and political costs for low- and middle-income states, and that existing epistemic authority reinforces unequal scrutiny.
A reconstructed enforcement architecture is proposed that responds to these political and structural constraints. It comprises three elements: incentive mechanisms that offset the costs of early reporting; a quasi-juridical compliance body capable of issuing authoritative determinations without coercive adjudication; and redistributive obligations that address core capacity deficits. These reforms can be advanced through a combination of World Health Assembly (WHA) resolutions, soft-law instruments, and targeted amendments to the IHR. Together, they offer a feasible pathway to transform the IHR from aspirational norms into a structured, politically realistic system of global health accountability.
Abstract
Global health governance operates through a legal framework that appears binding but, in practice, functions as voluntary cooperation. The International Health Regulations (2005) (hereinafter “IHR”) exemplify this contradiction. During COVID-19, states delayed notification, imposed unscientific travel restrictions, and selectively relied on World Health Organization (hereinafter “WHO”) guidance without legal consequence. These outcomes reflect structural design rather than isolated shortcomings. The IHR preserves sovereign discretion, denies the WHO juridical authority, and relies on epistemic legitimacy rather than enforceable obligations.
Three claims are advanced. First, doctrinal analysis shows that the IHR lacks compulsory jurisdiction, authoritative fact-finding, and remedial mechanisms, rendering compliance formally mandatory but substantively voluntary. Second, comparative institutional analysis demonstrates that enforceability in regimes such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) stems from sovereignty-limiting commitments and reciprocal incentives that the IHR intentionally avoid; the comparison illuminates institutional design, but its incentive structure—anchored in market access and retaliatory remedies—has no equivalent in global health. Third, insights from political economy and Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) reveal that disclosure duties generate disproportionate economic and political costs for low- and middle-income states, and that existing epistemic authority reinforces unequal scrutiny.
A reconstructed enforcement architecture is proposed that responds to these political and structural constraints. It comprises three elements: incentive mechanisms that offset the costs of early reporting; a quasi-juridical compliance body capable of issuing authoritative determinations without coercive adjudication; and redistributive obligations that address core capacity deficits. These reforms can be advanced through a combination of World Health Assembly (WHA) resolutions, soft-law instruments, and targeted amendments to the IHR. Together, they offer a feasible pathway to transform the IHR from aspirational norms into a structured, politically realistic system of global health accountability.
關鍵詞
- 類型
- 論文
- 期刊
- Asian Journal of WTO & International Health Law and policy
- ISSN
- 1819-5164
- 卷期
- 21卷2期
- 出版
- 2026年09月
- 頁碼
- 401–434
- 編號
- NTUEJ00000004
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