The Revival of Spectre: Voluntary Import Expansions and the WTO Compatibility
Ph.D Candidate, Institute of International Law, Wuhan University, China.
摘要
The Economic and Trade Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People’s Republic of China sets an objective for China’s trade purchases from the United States (hereinafter “US”) within a certain period, bringing back the Voluntary Import Expansions (hereinafter “VIEs”). During the GATT period, the Panel in Japan — Trade in Semi-conductors did not directly address the issue of whether the VIE in the US–Japan Semiconductor Agreement of 1986, was consistent with international trade obligations. There is also a lack of explicit rules in the WTO agreements to regulate VIEs. Some concerns have been raised that VIEs may breach WTO law. This article begins by providing a background to VIEs and discusses the nature, causes, features, and possible impacts of VIEs. Then, it examines which specific WTO rules and principles VIEs may be inconsistent with. It argues that VIEs may violate Article 1.1, Article 11.1 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (hereinafter “GATT”), Article 11.1(b) of the Agreement on Safeguards, and other WTO members whose trade benefits are impaired can bring non- violation complaints under Article 23.1(b) of GATT. Besides, VIEs are incompatible with the principle of good faith. This article concludes that VIEs may destroy the WTO multilateral trading system and should be prohibited.
Abstract
The Economic and Trade Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People’s Republic of China sets an objective for China’s trade purchases from the United States (hereinafter “US”) within a certain period, bringing back the Voluntary Import Expansions (hereinafter “VIEs”). During the GATT period, the Panel in Japan — Trade in Semi-conductors did not directly address the issue of whether the VIE in the US–Japan Semiconductor Agreement of 1986, was consistent with international trade obligations. There is also a lack of explicit rules in the WTO agreements to regulate VIEs. Some concerns have been raised that VIEs may breach WTO law. This article begins by providing a background to VIEs and discusses the nature, causes, features, and possible impacts of VIEs. Then, it examines which specific WTO rules and principles VIEs may be inconsistent with. It argues that VIEs may violate Article 1.1, Article 11.1 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (hereinafter “GATT”), Article 11.1(b) of the Agreement on Safeguards, and other WTO members whose trade benefits are impaired can bring non- violation complaints under Article 23.1(b) of GATT. Besides, VIEs are incompatible with the principle of good faith. This article concludes that VIEs may destroy the WTO multilateral trading system and should be prohibited.
關鍵詞
- 類型
- 論文
- 期刊
- Asian Journal of WTO & International Health Law and policy
- ISSN
- 1819-5164
- 卷期
- 18卷1期
- 出版
- 2023年03月
- 頁碼
- 231–276
- 編號
- NTUEJ00000051
同期目錄
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- Compulsory Licenses for Pharmaceutical Patents in China in Light of the TRIPS AgreementQian YIN・頁 131–180
- Between Old and New: Rethinking Modernization of China’s IIA RegimeKeer Huang・頁 181–230
- The Revival of Spectre: Voluntary Import Expansions and the WTO CompatibilityYaoyuan Zhang・頁 231–276