漢賊不兩立,王業不偏安? 蜀、吳兩國「統治集團」與「軍制」的差異如何影響其抗衡魏國的作為
No Coexistence with the Usurper, No Peace under Fragmented Rule? How Ruling Coalition Legitimacy and Military Institutions Shaped Shu and Wu’s Strategies Against Wei
國立政治大學東亞研究所(Graduate Institute of East Asia Studies, National Cheng-Chi University)
摘要
東漢末年,群雄割據,在「赤壁之戰」之後,形成魏、蜀、吳三強鼎立之局。然而,為什麼實力較弱的蜀國選擇積極進攻、屢次北伐的「過度制衡」,而實力較強的吳國則多以守勢為主,呈現「適度制衡」的情況,是各種制衡理論都無法解釋的差異。本文認為,這是因為兩國立國過程的差異而導致的「統治集團」與「軍制」的不同,進而影響各自「政權正當性的來源」與「軍事動員的能力」。蜀國從立國以來就存在「外來統治者」與「本土勢力」之間的競爭,對於非蜀地出身的統治集團而言,政權正當性的主要來源在於「匡復漢室」的大義,因此「北伐中原」就成為維繫統治的重要理由,此外,蜀國相對集權的軍制也使其得以集中軍力,支撐其較具攻勢性的制衡作為。相較之下,吳國是由外來勢力與江東地方豪族共同立國,其政權結構更具分權的性質,因此毋須以「匡復漢室」作為制衡號召,對長江中、下游關鍵戰略據點的爭奪才是其用兵目的,此外,吳國其分散化的軍制雖然有利於局部地區的防守,卻也限制了其動員北伐的能力。本文的發現,不僅補充了既有制衡理論的不足,也為理解國家在面臨外部威脅時如何因其「正當性需求」與「動員能力的差異」而採取不同的安全政策,還有當前的兩岸關係,提供了重要的理論啟示。
Abstract
At the end of the Eastern Han dynasty, China entered a period of warlord fragmentation that culminated in a tripartite balance among Wei, Shu, and Wu after the Battle of Red Cliffs. Although both Shu and Wu generally allied to balance against the stronger state of Wei, as neorealist theory would predict, the two states adopted markedly different strategies: the weaker Shu launched repeated northern expeditions, displaying an offensive form of overbalancing, whereas the relatively stronger Wu pursued a more restrained and defensive approach. Existing balancing theories offer limited explanatory leverage for this divergence. This article argues that the key lies in the distinct processes of state formation in Shu and Wu, which shaped their ruling coalitions, military institutions, and, consequently, their sources of political legitimacy and capacities for mobilization. In Shu, persistent competition between non–local elites and local factions meant that the legitimacy of non-native rulers depended heavily on claims to restore the Han dynasty, making northern campaigns a crucial basis for political authority. Shu’s centralized military structure further enabled the concentrated mobilization required for such offensives. By contrast, Wu emerged through cooperation between external leaders and an entrenched local gentry, producing a more decentralized political order. Wu’s security objectives centered on securing critical strategic locations along the middle and lower Yangtze River rather than needing to invoke the restoration of the Han dynasty, and its dispersed military system favored local defenses while limiting large-scale offensive capacities. This study not only supplements the limitations of existing balancing theories, but also offers broader theoretical insights into how states adopt different security strategies when confronting external threats depending on their distinct legitimacy requirements and mobilization capacities. The argument further provides an analytical lens for understanding contemporary crossStrait relations, where similar dynamics continue to shape state behavior.
關鍵詞
- 類型
- 研究論文
- 期刊
- 政治科學論叢
- ISSN
- 1018-3892
- 卷期
- 108期
- 出版
- 2026年06月
- 頁碼
- 001–054
- 編號
- NTUEJ00005823
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