Waltz制衡假設之檢視:以波斯灣三次衝突爲例
Examining Kenneth Waltz's Balancing Assumption: Case Studies of Three Conflicts in the Persian Gulf
國立高雄大學政治法律學系(Department of Government and Law, National University of Kaohsiung)
摘要
制衡假設是新現實主義大師瓦爾茲解釋國際體系之權力平衡重複發生的重要根據,然而國際體系在冷戰結束後形成以美國爲主導的單極體系,但其他國際強權卻未對美國權力集中的情形進行制衡。本論文研究冷戰前後發生於波斯灣的三次戰爭,亦發現冷戰後的兩次波灣戰爭中,其他國際強權均未對美國採取制衡行動。本論文分析二級國際強權未在波斯灣進行制衡的原因,並從相對權力地位及體系層次之差異的角度認爲,此等現象尚不足以論證瓦爾茲的理論有誤。此外,本論文也剖析瓦爾茲有關單極體系下之制衡及回復平衡的論述,藉以重新釐清其簡約理論的內涵與特質,同時也探討其他新現實主義者對制衡行爲的解釋,特別是攻-守權衡論、利益平衡論及威脅平衡論等多變因分析,並評估他們對瓦爾茲理論的補充效果。
Abstract
The balancing assumption is the hard core of Kenneth N. Waltz's explanation of how systemic balances of power form recurrently. Although the international political system has become unipolar since the end of the Cold War, great power balancing against US's unbalanced power has yet to occur. This paper investigates three Persian Gulf conflicts and finds that great powers did not engage in balancing against US during the two Persian Gulf conflicts that broke out after the end of the Cold War. The paper analyzes why balancing behavior was absent, and suggests that this phenomenon is insufficient to falsify Waltz's theory mainly because the conflicts occurred at the regional subsystem level as opposed at Waltz's structural level of analysis. Furthermore, this article examines Waltz's arguments about balancing behavior and balanced outcomes in order to gain a clearer understanding of his parsimonious theory. The paper also discusses other neorealist explanations of balancing behavior, especially the theories of offense-defense balance, balance of interests, and balance of threats, and evaluates whether they could complement Waltz's theory.
關鍵詞
- 類型
- 研究論文
- 期刊
- 政治科學論叢
- ISSN
- 1018-3892
- 卷期
- 40期
- 出版
- 2009年06月
- 頁碼
- 043–080
- 編號
- NTUEJ00006087
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