洛克的同意論
Consent in Locke
中央研究院中山人文社會科學研究所(Sun Yat-Sen Institute for Social Science and Philosophy, Academia Sinica)
- 卷期
- 17期
- 出版
- 2002年12月
- 頁碼
- 199–218
- 編號
- NTUEJ00006222
摘要
在其《政府二論》的下論中,洛克將政治義務奠基於個人的同意之上。同意的表達又分為明示同意與默示同意,但兩者之並存使其理論產生極大的混淆與困難:前者適用的對象極少,而後者則包含在政府領域內的所有人,其理論的應用性與道德力量因之大受限制。不同的學者對此問題作出不同的詮釋與爭論。本文認為同意論在洛克思想中並未失去作為政治義務的道德來源。明示同意主要適用於創新或加入一個政治社群,默示同意則經由自然法、自然狀態及自然權利的理論背景之下,一方面透過居留─利益─服從等機制而隱含了相互性原則的感恩論,另一方面由於存在各種表達不同意的自由與機制,使得默示同意作為政治義務道德基礎的同時,仍然保留了個人自由意志與自主性。
Abstract
Locke's consent theory of political obligation is puzzling and confusing in that its application is either too narrow in the case of express consent or too broad in the case of tacit consent. Hence the contesting interpretations between the scholars of Locke. I contend that the two notions of consent can be retained but be used in different occasions. For Locke, express consent is applied mainly to those who initiate or join into a political community, while tacit consent implies both a possible connotation of gratitude principle through the residence – benefits – obedience mechanism on the one hand, and voluntarism as far as freedom and ways of expressing dissent are available, on the other. Thus, tacit consent in Locke can ground political obligation without eliminating individual free will and autonomy.