臺大學術期刊資料庫NTU Journal Database

蘇聯的崩解─「危機及時序」分析途徑

The Collapse Of The Soviet Union: A Crises and Sequences Approach

吳玉山(Yu-shan Wu)

中央研究院政治學研究所(Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica)

卷期
4期
出版
1992年12月
頁碼
179–223
編號
NTUEJ00006366
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摘要

本文採用「危機及時序」(Crises and Sequences)的分析途徑來解釋蘇聯的崩解。全文包含三個部分。第一部分就現有的理論加以分析。我們發現傳統的現代化理論對蘇聯崩解的背景有很強的解釋力,但論及時機、過程及各種社會因素的交互作用則明顯不足。另一方面政治轉型理論雖然較少決定論的色彩,卻太過於著重過程,而疏忽了其他面向。這類理論對蘇聯崩解所包含的複雜社會因素,比現代化理論更缺乏掌握的能力。由班德等人在一九七一年所提出的「危機及時序」的模型,一方面顧及背景,一方面包含過程,提供了很好的解釋框架,但如用到蘇聯的例子上,則必須加以修正。在本文的第二部分,就針對蘇聯的情況提出了修正的「危機及時序」理論,在其中提出了外部效應(Externalities)及擴散效應(Spillovers)的概念,並強調了民族問題的重要性。
在本文的第三部分,我們用修正後的理論來解釋蘇聯的狀況。在蘇聯崩解的過程中,一共有七個時期:布里茲涅夫晚期(八○年代初)、「重建」初期(一九八五~八六)、「公開性」時期(一九八六~八八)、民主化時期(一九八八~八九)、民族問題爆發時期(一九八九~九○)、保守派反撲階段(一九九○~九一)及最後的崩解(一九九一年底)。經由我們的分析,發現蘇聯的覆亡關鍵點在領導者的錯算。戈巴契夫原擬在經濟領域內挑起群眾壓力,助其排除保守派的反對,以重建蘇聯的經濟體制。結果卻在參與及民族問題的領域,造成了負面的外部效應,受到激進民主主義者及民族主義的挑戰。一個多重危機的局勢因而出現,致使蘇聯的系統超載,並終不免於瓦解。

Abstract

This paper uses the crises and sequences approach to analyze the collapse of the Soviet Union. It has three parts. The first part reviews the literatures in the field and finds that the modernization theories provide a valuable background analysis, but fail to capture the timing, the process, and the complex roots of the revolutionary changes in the Soviet Union. The political transition literature, on the other hand, is less deterministic, but overly process-oriented. It is even less capable to integrate wide contextual variables into its framework. The original crises and sequences model as proposed by Binder et al. in 1971 has the merit of combining elements of both preconditions and process, but needs refining to suit the Soviet case. In the second part, a modified crises and sequences model is proposed that redefines crises, more clearly spells out externalities and spillovers, and stresses the importance of the nationality problems. The third part of the paper tests the modified model against the Soviet case.
Seven stages are identified to facilitate the analysis: the Brezhnevian prelude (early 1980’s), early perestroika (1985~1986), glasnost’ (1986~1988), demokratizatsia (1988~1989), nationality eruption (1989~1990), conservative comeback (1990~1991), and final collapse (end of 1991). Through this analysis, we find that the Soviet collapse is primarily the result of elite miscalculation. Gorbachev’s initial strategy to whip up popular demand in the economic area ended up creating negative externalities in the problem areas of participation (demand for multi-party democracy) and nationality (demand for national independence by the non-Russian republics). The result was a multi-crisis situation that overloaded the Soviet system and caused its disintegration.

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