高階經理人和基層員工間薪酬差距與公司信用評等
Within-Firm Pay Inequality and Corporate Credit Rating
國立嘉義大學財務金融學系(Department of Banking and Finance, National Chia Yi University);國立成功大學會計學系暨財務金融研究所(Department of Accountancy and Graduate Institute of Finance, National Cheng Kung University);國立嘉義大學財務金融學系(Department of Banking and Finance, National Chia Yi University)
摘要
台灣主管機關於2018年規定,2019年起強制要求上市櫃公司須公開揭露前一年之「非擔任主管全時員工薪酬資訊」。基於員工薪酬資料可得之機會,本研究以高階經理人和基層員工薪酬倍數比率衡量兩者薪酬差距,旨在探討「高階經理人相對於基層員工薪酬倍數比率」和信用評等之關係,並延伸探討控制股東股權結構對此關係的影響。本文以2018至2021年之台灣上市櫃公司為樣本,實證結果顯示,薪酬倍數比率越高,公司信用評等表現越佳,支持人才分配理論和競賽理論,表示薪酬差距對公司有維繫人才與提供激勵之效果,高階經理人更有動機最大化公司長期價值,因而減少和各利害關係人之代理衝突,並可減緩未來經營之不確定性,信用評等機構因而對公司的信用風險評估較為樂觀。其次,考量控制股東所有權和控制權偏離程度可能隱含公司之薪酬倍數比率具有不公平性與利益掠奪之經濟意涵,故進一步納入分析。實證發現:控制股東股權偏離程度負面衝擊薪酬倍數比率和信用評等表現兩者間的關係,顯示控制股東股權偏離越高,薪酬倍數比率越可能肇因於掠奪誘因而使厭惡不公平感加深,影響公司未來績效,導致信用評等機構預期高薪酬倍數比率可能提升未來信用風險。
Abstract
Taiwan's regulatory authorities stipulated in 2018 that all listed firms are required to publicly disclose the "non-executive full-time employee compensation information" of the previous year starting in 2019. Given the availability of compensation information on both top executive and non-executive full-time employees, this study investigates the relationship between the executive-to-worker pay ratio and corporate credit rating. We also investigate how the divergence in the control rights and ownership of controlling shareholders affects the relationship. Using a sample of Taiwanese firms publicly traded on either the Taiwan Stock Exchange or the Taipei Stock Exchange between 2018 and 2021, the empirical results show that the higher the pay ratio, the better the credit rating, supporting the talent assignment theory and tournament theory. This suggests that the pay gaps help firms attract talented executives and motivate their greatest efforts to enhance long-term firm value, which lowers firms’ uncertainty about future operations and in turn increases the credit rating. Next, we find that the degree of deviation between the controlling shareholder's ownership and control rights negatively affects the relationship between the pay ratio and credit rating. This result implies that the higher the degree of deviation, the more likely the pay gap is induced by the rent extraction of controlling shareholders, which deepens the aversion of various stakeholders to unfairness and in turn increases uncertainty about firms’ future performance and credit risk evaluation.
關鍵詞
- 類型
- 論文
- 期刊
- 會計審計論叢
- ISSN
- 2221-9374
- 卷期
- 14卷2期
- 出版
- 2024年12月
- 頁碼
- 87–132
- 編號
- NTUEJ00006413
同期目錄
- 會計研究與會計教育數位轉型-培育具備會計專業的數據科學家劉順仁(Shuen-Zen Liu)・頁 I–IV
- COVID-19下企業海外子公司之重要性是否會延長財報公告時間之落差?審計產業專家觀點張瑀珊(Yu-Shan Chang);薛敏正(Min-Jeng Shiue);王彥鈞(Ian Wang)・頁 1–40
- 企業社會責任績效與年報可讀性關聯性之研究陳宗岡(Tsung-Kang Chen);廖咸興(Hsien-Hsing Liao);曾怡潔(Yijie Tseng);郝昀(Yun Hao);王鍇(Kai Wang)・頁 41–86
- 高階經理人和基層員工間薪酬差距與公司信用評等蔡柳卿(Liu-Ching Tsai);陳苑如(Yuan-Ju Chen);張佩琪(Pei-Chi Chang)・頁 87–132
- 新型冠狀肺炎疫情對審計公費僵固性之影響邱献良(Hsien-Lian Chiu);謝佳純(Chia-Chun Hsieh);鄒玲瑜(Ling-Yu Tsou)・頁 133–168