從選秀策略到球員待遇: 簽約金總額上限制度的影響
From Draft Strategy to Player Compensation: The Impact of the Signing Bonus Pool Cap
國立台灣大學經濟學系(Department of Economics, National Taiwan University);國立台灣大學經濟學系(Department of Economics, National Taiwan University);第一商業銀行(First Commercial Bank)
摘要
本文探討2012年美國職棒大聯盟 (Major League Baseball) 實施選秀簽約金總額上限政策後, 對球隊選秀策略以及新秀球員職涯發展所帶來的影響。研究結果顯示, 制度上路後, 整體選秀簽約成功率顯著提升, 球隊在選擇球員時也更加偏好大學球員, 使得高中球員被選中的機率明顯下降。此外, 球隊傾向將有限的簽約資源集中投入於高天賦球員, 導致前段輪次球員的簽約金占比提高。最後, 在制度實施前, 豪門球隊在後段輪次能以較高簽約金吸引簽約風險高、但潛力突出的球員; 然而, 在總額上限政策實施後, 豪門球隊在後段輪次的簽約金支出大幅減少。
Abstract
This paper examines the effects of the signing bonus pool cap introduced in Major League Baseball (MLB) in 2012 on teams' draft strategies and the career development of drafted players. Using a difference-in-differences framework, we show that the reform significantly increased overall signing rates. Following the policy change, teams became more likely to select college players, leading to a substantial decline in the probability that high school players were drafted. In addition, teams reallocated limited signing resources toward higher-talent prospects, resulting in a larger share of signing bonuses being concentrated among early-round picks. Prior to the reform, large-market teams were able to use generous bonuses in later rounds to attract high-risk but high-upside prospects. After the implementation of the bonus cap, however, their spending in later rounds declined markedly. Overall, the policy reshaped the allocation of signing bonuses across draft rounds and altered the competitive dynamics of player acquisition.
關鍵詞
- 類型
- 論文
- 期刊
- 經濟論文叢刊
- ISSN
- 1018-3833
- 卷期
- 54卷3期
- 出版
- 2026年09月
- 頁碼
- 291–336
- 編號
- NTUEJ00006560
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