最適回收成分標準應隨民營化政策而調整嗎?
Should Recycled Content Standards be Raised in Response to Privatization?
國立中央大學經濟學系(Department of Economics, National Central University);東吳大學國際經營與貿易學系(Department of International Business, Soochow University)
摘要
本文分析在下游混合寡占市場中的政府最適回收成分標準政策 (recycled content standards, RCS), 並探討其應如何因應可能的民營化政策而調整。民營化前, 在上游回收市場為完全競爭的情況下, 若未回收廢棄物的邊際損害小於以回收料取代原生料所造成的成本增加, 則政府無需實施 RCS; 反之, 則應採取最嚴格的 RCS。民營化後, 最適的 RCS 將可能存在介於0與1之間的內解。若民營化會擴大總產出並增加環境總損害, 則最適 RCS 應隨民營化而趨於嚴格; 反之, 若民營化減少總產出, 則最適 RCS 應隨民營化而放鬆。本文亦考慮上游獨占的情形, 並發現最適 RCS 的主要結果在質性上仍然成立。進一步比較不同上游市場結構可知, 一般而言, 最適 RCS 在上游獨占時會較完全競爭下為高。
Abstract
This study analyzes the government's optimal recycled content standards (RCS) policy in a downstream mixed duopoly and examines how the policy should be adjusted in response to privatization. Before privatization, when the upstream recycling market is perfectly competitive, no RCS is needed if the marginal damage from unrecycled waste is smaller than the cost increase caused by substituting recycled materials for virgin materials; otherwise, the government should adopt the most stringent RCS. After privatization, the optimal RCS may instead emerge as an interior solution between zero and one. If privatization expands total output and thereby increases environmental damage, the optimal RCS should become more stringent. Conversely, if privatization reduces total output, the optimal RCS should be relaxed. We also consider the case of an upstream monopoly and show that the main qualitative results regarding the optimal RCS continue to hold. A comparison across upstream market structures further indicates that the optimal RCS tends to be higher under upstream monopoly than under perfect competition.
關鍵詞
- 類型
- 論文
- 期刊
- 經濟論文叢刊
- ISSN
- 1018-3833
- 卷期
- 54卷3期
- 出版
- 2026年09月
- 頁碼
- 365–397
- 編號
- NTUEJ00006562
同期目錄
- 從選秀策略到球員待遇: 簽約金總額上限制度的影響林明仁(Ming-Jen Lin);陳由常(Yu-Chang Chen);歐陽弘偉(Hong-Wei Ouyang)・頁 291–336
- 台灣通膨不均之長期演變紀鈞惟(Chun-Wei Chi);蔡宜展(Yi-Chan Tsai)・頁 337–364
- 最適回收成分標準應隨民營化政策而調整嗎?邱俊榮(Jiunn-Rong Chiou);陳宏易(Hung-Yi Chen)・頁 365–397