分紅制度、企業社會責任和租稅治理制度是否能激勵經理人努力工作和減少逃稅
Can Dividend Sharing, Corporate Social Responsibility, and Tax Governance Systems Motivate Managers to Work Harder and Reduce Tax Evasion?
逢甲大學財稅學系(Department of Public Finance, Feng Chia University);嶺東科技大學會計資訊學系(Graduate Institute of Accounting and Information Technology, Ling Tung University)
摘要
本文將企業社會責任、 分紅制度、 稽核審查、追討短報公司收益和處罰機制放入當事人 --- 代理人模型中, 探討分紅制度、企業社會責任和租稅治理是否能激勵經理人努力工作和減少逃稅, 獲得結論為: (1) 分紅比例和企業社會責任支出增加能使經理人提高工作努力程度, 也能抑制經理人短報公司收益行為。 (2) 租稅治理制度會使股東選擇較低的分紅比例, 若處罰逃稅行為的罰款低,無法抑制逃稅行為; 若罰款高就能抑制逃稅行為, 但要以經理人減少工作努力、企業社會支出減少、 經理人和股東效用減少作為代價。
Abstract
This paper incorporates corporate social responsibility (CSR), profit-based compensation sharing, auditing, recovery of underreported corporate earnings, and penalty mechanisms into the principal-agent model. It explores whether dividend- sharing systems, corporate social responsibility, and tax governance can motivate managers to work hard and reduce tax evasion. The conclusions are as follows: 1. Increasing the ratio of profit-based compensation and corporate social responsibility (CSR) expenditures can motivate managers to work harder and curb their tendency to underreport company earnings. 2. Tax governance systems can lead shareholders to choose a lower profit-based compensation ratio. If the penalties for tax evasion are low, they cannot effectively curb tax evasion behaviors. However, if the penalties are high, they can suppress tax evasion but at the cost of reduced managerial effort, decreased corporate social responsibility expenditures, and lower utility for both managers and shareholders.
關鍵詞
- 類型
- 論文
- 期刊
- 經濟論文叢刊
- ISSN
- 1018-3833
- 卷期
- 53卷1期
- 出版
- 2025年03月
- 頁碼
- 35–70
- 編號
- NTUEJ00006580
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