廠商勾結對技術授權與消費者福利的影響
Collusion, Technology Licensing and Welfare
輔仁大學經濟學系(Department of Economics, Fu Jen Catholic University, Taipei, Taiwan);輔仁大學經濟學系(Department of Economics, Fu Jen Catholic University, Taipei, Taiwan)
摘要
在廠商間具有勾結的特徵下, 廠商如何進行技術授權與競爭是本文主要分析議題。本文建立一個結合廠商勾結行為與技術授權的一般化模型, 分析結果指出當廠商勾結程度較大(小) 時, 授權廠商偏好固定權利金授權(單位權利金授權)。 隨著廠商勾結程度的增加, 最適技術授權契約會由單位權利金授權, 演變成固定權利金授權, 使得消費者福利與社會福利不降反升。 再者, 若授權廠商採取兩部定價授權時, 結果顯示當廠商勾結程度為中間值時, 其均衡固定權利金與均衡單位權利金均大於0, 且隨著廠商勾結程度的增加, 消費者福利與社會福利均愈大。
Abstract
The main aim of this paper is to explore the optimal licensing contract in the context of collusion (or cooperation) among firms. We establish a model incorporating collusion and technology licensing within a duopolistic market. The key findings are as follows. If the licensor is restricted to one-part tariff licensing, and the degree of collusion is high (low), fixed-fee licensing is found to be more (less) profitable than royalty licensing. As the degree of collusion increases, the optimal licensing contract shifts from royalty licensing to fixed-fee licensing, improving both consumer welfare and social welfare. On the other hand, if the licensor adopts two-part tariff licensing, the results show that if the degree of collusion is at an intermediate level, both the optimal fixed fee and royalty are greater than zero. As collusion intensifies, both consumer welfare and social welfare increase. These findings sharply contrast with the conclusions of existing collusion literature with no licensing.
關鍵詞
- 類型
- 論文
- 期刊
- 經濟論文叢刊
- ISSN
- 1018-3833
- 卷期
- 53卷1期
- 出版
- 2025年03月
- 頁碼
- 71–107
- 編號
- NTUEJ00006581
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