產業聚集與政治經濟學觀點的公共財提供
Industrial Agglomeration and Public Goods Provision from a Political Economy Perspective
國立台北大學都市計劃研究所(Graduate Institute of Urban Planning, National Taipei University)
摘要
本研究在新經濟地理 (NEG) 的Forslid and Ottaviano (2003)模型中, 探討可移動勞工在兩區的遷徙而與不可移動勞工形成的新群體如何經由投票來提供公共財。而提供公共財的稅率決策分別探討由分散體系與集中體系來決定。研究結果顯示在分散體系中, 當可移動勞工比例上升時, 有兩種增加稅率的效果。一為聚集力量的增加而形成聚集租 (Baldwin and Krugman, 2004), 另一因可移動勞工多於不可移動勞工而經由投票改變公共財的偏好。在集中體系中, 則有兩種相同機率的稅率方案。
Abstract
This study explores the migration of mobile workers between two regions to form new communities with the immobile workers in the spatial distribution and the local public goods being provided by the new communities via voting in the Forslid and Ottaviano (2003) version of new economic geography. The tax rate for the provision of local public goods in each region is determined by either a decentralized system or by a centralized system. The results show that in a decentralized system, there are two effects of an increase in the tax rate when the share of mobile workers increases. One is the increase in agglomeration force to form an “agglomeration rent” (Baldwin and Krugman, 2004). The other is the change of preference for public goods via voting since the number of mobile workers dominates that of immobile workers. In a centralized system, there are two tax rate alternatives for each region with equal probability.
關鍵詞
- 類型
- 論文
- 期刊
- 經濟論文叢刊
- ISSN
- 1018-3833
- 卷期
- 52卷4期
- 出版
- 2024年10月
- 頁碼
- 411–444
- 編號
- NTUEJ00006584
同期目錄
- 台灣的利率政策與房價陳旭昇(Shiu-Sheng Chen);陳柏瑜(Bo-Yie Chen)・頁 377–409
- 產業聚集與政治經濟學觀點的公共財提供蔡智發(Jyh-Fa Tsai)・頁 411–444
- 資產規模、多角化與銀行風險: 台灣實證研究劉景中(Jin-Chung Liu)・頁 445–522