遵從非威懾性正式制裁:同儕制裁效果和投票效果
Obedience to Rules with Mild Formal Sanctions: The Roles of Informal Sanctions and Voting
國立臺灣大學經濟學系(Department of Economics, National Taiwan University)
摘要
若要使經濟理性人遵從法令上的微弱制裁, 就需要有額外的輔助, 包括(1)同儕間的非正式制裁力量以及(2)通過投票實施這個非威懾性正式制裁。我在實驗室實驗中研究了非威懾性正式制裁對自願捐獻公共財的影響。我發現同儕間的非正式制裁會加強正式制裁的效果。具體來說,在這個有限重複的博弈中, 當正式制裁和非正式制裁同時存在時, 受試者的捐獻額會隨著回合數不變或上升, 這可能是因爲,貢獻額每低於小組平均一分, 就會受到同儕的懲罰。 然而, 我發現通過投票實施這個非威懾性正式制裁,相較於控制組, 對貢獻額沒有任何顯著的效果。
Abstract
Governments sometimes promote rules backed by sanctions too weak to make obedience privately optimal. Factors that may help make such rules effective include the presence of informal sanctions by peers, and implementation through voting. I study the impact of non-deterrent formal sanctions on voluntary contributions to a public good in a laboratory experiment. I find that informal sanctions strengthen the effect of formal ones in most conditions. Specifically, in this finitely repeated game, there are flat trends or upward trends when both formal sanctions and informal sanctions are present. This might be due to the fact that the low-contributors were punished by their peers for every point they contributed less than the group average. However, voted implementation of a non-deterrent formal sanction has no significant effect on contribution in my data.
關鍵詞
- 類型
- 論文
- 期刊
- 經濟論文叢刊
- ISSN
- 1018-3833
- 卷期
- 52卷1期
- 出版
- 2024年01月
- 頁碼
- 1–48
- 編號
- NTUEJ00006592
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