產業外產品創新授權及福利分析
Quality Competition, Outsider Patentee Licensing, and Welfare
國立東華大學經濟學系教授 (Department of Economics, National Dong-Hua University),國立東華大學經濟學系博士班生 (PhD student, Department of Economics, National Dong-Hua University),國立東華大學經濟學系碩士班生 (Master student, Department of Economics, National Dong-Hua University), 國立東華大學經濟學系教授(Department of Economics, National Dong-Hua University)
摘要
本文利用循序談判賽局探討在品質異質的雙占價格競爭中,業外品質技術擁有者的授權行為。本文得到: (1) 如果新技術屬於利潤極大化的業外廠商,則當授權前的品質競爭不激烈,新技術授權給高品質廠商並收取策略授權金;當授權前的品質競爭激烈, 但是新技術提高品質有限,以傳統授權金移轉技術給高品質廠商;當授權前的品質競爭激烈, 但是新技術可以大幅提升品質,以傳統授權金移轉技術給低品質廠商為最有利。(2) 如果新技術屬於政府,政府會希望將新技術移轉給低品質廠商;當新技術與高品質差異不大時,需補貼低品質廠商使用新技術。
Abstract
We analyze the optimal licensing strategy of an outside patent holder of a superior quality technology for a Bertrand duopoly with different product quality in a finite stage sequential bargaining game. Two types of fixed-fees are considered, a strategic one and the conventional one. If the new technology is owned by a revenue maximizing outsider, it is shown that the optimal licensing strategy is transferring the patent (1) to the original high quality firm with a strategic fixed fee when the quality difference between the duopoly is large enough, (2) to the original high quality firm with a conventional fixed fee when the quality difference is small and the new technology helps little, and (3) to the original low quality firm with a conventional fixed fee, otherwise. If the new technology is owned by a social welfare maximizing government agency, it is shown that transferring technology to the low quality firm is optimal and a subsidy is required in case the new quality is improved very little.
關鍵詞
- 類型
- 論文
- 期刊
- 經濟論文叢刊
- ISSN
- 1018-3833
- 卷期
- 46卷4期
- 出版
- 2018年12月
- 頁碼
- 619–644
- 編號
- NTUEJ00006675
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