十二年國教免試入學分發制度之賽局分析
A Game Theoretical Analysis of Student Assignment Mechanisms Under the 12-Year Compulsory Education Program in Taiwan
東吳大學經濟系(Department of Economics, Soochow University);Washington University in St. Louis
;中央研究院經濟研究所(Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica)
摘要
台灣於2014年開始實施十二年國教。其中分發制度的志願序設計是引發學生和家長爭議的主要焦點之一。本文建立一個十二年國教分發制度下的簡化賽局模型,比較納入志願序作為入學比序依據的新制,以及傳統填志願依成績分發的舊制。我們首先描述學生可能的因應策略,並刻劃在新舊分發制度下的純策略均衡。接著我們以一個典型的混合均衡為例,分別說明在新制下可能的長期均衡結果。我們發現,最好的學生不受影響,然後大致上會依照成績由優至劣對學生產生由弊至利的各種影響。另外,學校錄取的學生組成會更多樣化,成績較差的學生開始有可能進入第一志願的學校,並且缺額的情況將可能出現在傳統分發制度下從來不會發生的學校。
Abstract
The government in Taiwan implemented 12-year compulsory education in 2014. Among its several measures, the newly adopted student assignment mechanism caused intense debate in Taiwan. In this paper, we construct a model in which students submit their school choices and characterize the pure Nash equilibria under both the new and the original system. We then provide an example with a typical mixed equilibrium to illustrate its welfare and efficiency outcome. We find that, under the new system, the best students are not affected while the second-tier students lose and the last-tier students gain. Under the new system, schools will be more likely to admit students from all tiers, although all schools may have vacancies now that only occurred in the least preferred schools under the old system.
關鍵詞
- 類型
- 論文
- 期刊
- 經濟論文叢刊
- ISSN
- 1018-3833
- 卷期
- 44卷2期
- 出版
- 2016年06月
- 頁碼
- 215–255
- 編號
- NTUEJ00006713
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